

Some Problems of the Philosophy of Religion

Dr. S. R. DASGUPTA

SOME PROBLEMS
OF
THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

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To
My Preceptor
Dr. S. Radhakrishnan.

PREFACE

The book is based on some notes originally prepared for the use of my students in Honours classes. It is at the request and persistent insistence of Sriman Mrigendranath Bhattacharyya, an old student and at present a colleague of mine as also of my friends Profs. Amal Ghosh and Anil Banerjee that they have been reoriented, enlarged and finally brought out in book-form. As the title of the book indicates, it is not so much a history of the Philosophy of Religion as, more or less, a critical survey of some of its problems that cover, to a great extent, the syllabi, prescribed for the Honours candidates of the Universities of India. Although not in itself a self-sufficient treatise, the book, nevertheless, proposes to serve as an incentive, for the young learners, to get into touch with the master minds, dealing with these problems more elaborately in their books. If it succeeds in the direction so desired, no further success is sought or prayed for.

In the preparation of the book, I have had obligations to acknowledge to some of my colleagues and friends, who have helped me a lot in comparing the proofs with the MS and making corrections, here and there, both in the proofs as also in the 'Make-up'. Still there might be some mistakes that have obviously escaped detection. The bibliography, given at the end of the book, does, by no means, exhaust the names of the eminent scholars, whose books I have read and made use of in writing out the book. Special mention must, however, be made of a booklet, which is meant for the

little children, and which I suddenly came across at the residence of a relative of mine. The chapter on Christianity has profited much by the use of the book, a few of the sentences of which have been quoted almost verbatim. For chapters like Carvakas, Jainism and Buddhism, I am indebted to Profs. Dutta and Chatterjee for the use that I have made of their book, entitled "An Introduction to Indian Philosophy". My indebtedness to many others has, in due course, been acknowledged in the body of the book.

At the end, I must express my thankfulness to Sri Tapan Kumar Ghosh and the Proprietors of the Sarat Press Ltd., who have all through taken a very keen interest in the book and have finally rushed it through the press within a comparatively short period of time, and for that no less thanks are due to the Press-workers as well.

Kalyani,
1.12.65.

S. R. DASGUPTA

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INTRODUCTION

Of all the adventures that the human mind has undertaken, the adventure in the region of faith and religion is the most formidable and the most difficult one. Its activities in other spheres, even in that of values, have physical and social responses signifying the authenticity and correctness of the procedure adopted, but in that of religion, it has to grapple with the unseen and the unknown. The non-perceptibility of what the religion aims at has led many people to rely solely on dogmatic faith in what the seers do or the scriptures say. *Mahajana jena gata sa pantha*. Follow the footsteps of the seers. That is the only way leading to God. Lord Krishna is knowable through faith and not through logical dialecticism or intellectual casuistries. Reason in man centres round the earth and what is earthly. Science can go no farther than to the boundary-line of the phenomenal world. The polarities of subject and object are not applicable to the cases of relation, as in religion, between man and God. To know is to condition. The Absolute and the Infinite is above all conditions, and hence it cannot be an object of knowledge. It remains thus ever unknown and unknowable. Besides, any attempt on the part of man to know or to prove the existence of God is equivalent to putting man above God, i.e., to find reason for the existence of the Infinite in the finite. Furthermore, ratiocination takes the mind away from the divine reality, and instead of or in the place of God, it gives arguments;

notions, propositions, etc., concerning God which again, abstractions as they are, break the otherwise living reality up into so many fragments and parts. "The understanding works by fixed categories which represent only separate aspects of truth. What it produces, therefore, is a number of fixed abstractions standing in hard and fast distinction from each other; and the one thing which it is incapable of reproducing is that which is the most important of all...the living link which bound them together and made them one." (Caird: *The Philosophy of Religion*, P. 39.) So through reason or the method of science, God is ever unapproachable. Man can know God only when, out of His infinite mercy, He makes Himself known to him. Revelation and no intellectual manoeuvring can bring God on earth.

To question the authority of reason to pry into the secrecies of the divine is equivalent to saying that the way to God is based on irrationalism or that God is above reason. In the former case, the human self is divided against itself; one is rational and the other irrational. This leads to the theory of the bifurcation of the self which is not tenable, except in cases of lunacy. In the latter case, a lot depends on the sense in which the term "Above" is used. Qualitative distinction leads to the above problem of bifurcation. There is again, quantitatively considered, the need of a boundary-line in between the reason, meant for science and the reason, earmarked for religion. To say that reason, as used in science, weighing less in quantity than what it is in religion, can go thus far and no farther is, according to the theory of relativity, equal to the admission of the fact of transcendence, on the part of reason, of the line of demarcation. "To pronounce that our knowledge is...limited,

we must have access to some standard to which that limited knowledge is referred, we must be aware at least of the existence of something beyond the limit." (Ibid. P. 15). The fact is that there can be no stalemate or stagnation anywhere in the process onward of human knowledge. Reason in science and in religion is essentially the same reason, only more acute and intense, while employed in the latter. There is an unbreakable continuity between simple faith, reason and intuition. The faith as in religion is reason implicit, while reason as in science and philosophy is faith self-conscious. "The knowledge which is involved in feeling (faith) is...only implicit or virtual...knowledge; it must become something more and higher before it can truly deserve the name." (Caird: *Philosophy of Religion*, P. 2). In intuitive vision or realisation of God, it becomes more self-conscious. Abstractions, made in scientific investigations are only superficial and contingent. Science breaks the superficial unity into parts so as to get the real unity behind the diversities of forms and shapes. If partial revelation of truth is a charge against the method of science, it may equally be levelled against intuition, for neither of the two is supposed to exhaust the entire contents of God, which are inexhaustible. Truth is its own witness. But to prove its identity or existence, it must appear before, and get some sort of response from consciousness. Else, it may be a truth, but a truth for none. Intuition is one such consciousness but not the only one, although undoubtedly it is the highest kind of consciousness, man is capable of having of the empirically unseen and the unknown. Yet the mystic vision of truth is no negation but an affirmation of the first awakening of religious consciousness in man, based as it is on faith. Dogmatic belief, however, crude, has nevertheless a reason behind.

In the very denial of reason, its affirmation is established. Historically viewed, there is, in course of time, gradual emergence of higher and higher types of religion concomitantly with the development of higher and higher kind of speculative and other functional activities on the part of man. The concepts of Nature-God, Polytheistic Gods, Transcendental God, Immanent God and lastly the Absolute or the Brahman are so many factual stages indicative simultaneously of the psychical growth on the part of man as also of the self-revelation on the side of the Divine. Approach from man to God and God to man is the essence of all religions. Although, as Hegel says, thought and being are identical, and God is irrational, unless He is amenable to human reason, He is not for that, thought and reason alone. He is thought, love and moral good at the same time and in the same person, if of course, personality is ascribable to Him. Dharma is truth in action, lovingly consecrated to God. In the mystic or intuitive vision of God, there is the co-mingling of all the elements—cognitive, emotional and volitional—in man. "The soul is not divisible into compartments and in every psychical process all the elements are involved, though the degree in which they are severally present may be very different." (Galloway : *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 274). In the words of Prof. S. Radhakrishnan, "True religion requires us to see to it that our religion is a reasonable one, it requires us to see to it that our religion is a moral one, it requires us to see to it that our religion is a spiritual one...these are the traits of every authentic religion." (See his talk on the occasion of the opening of Sri Chaitanya Research Institute, Calcutta, as printed in 'the A. B. Patrika' of 30. 6. '64.). To this, it may further be added that it requires us to see to it that our religion is a loving one for, unlike reli-

gions that are spurious and that make people hate one another, it will make them love one another. So many religions are so many roads to salvation. There is no single royal road, as such, to God. Mutual tolerance and no mutual hatred is what is needed and needed very badly.

THE NEED OF RELIGION

The need, in all cases, focuses a feeling of want in respect of an object that the subject is in need of. Hunger points to food as a need, love to an object of love and compassion to the compassioned. The forces of hunger and love are common in all men. So is the hunger for God. In every form of religion," says Galloway, "man seeks to establish a helpful relationship between himself and the higher powers. The impulse to form this relationship, and to secure satisfaction through it, proceeded from a felt need; and this need must have been latent in human nature. (Galloway: *The Philosophy of Religion*, P. 57-58) However much an atheist might deny God, the very denial presupposes His existence, at least as an idea, in the mind of the man who denies Him. Again, if the existence of a man leading an immoral life or of one averse to the aesthetic beauty of things and faces is no proof for the non-existence of the moral principles or of beauty in the world as such, atheism is no guarantee for the non-existence of God and of the non-necessity of religion. "To show," in the words of J. Caird, "that religion is necessary to man as man, we are not required to show that no human being has existed who has not felt that necessity Again it is possible to hold that there is a science of aesthetics capable of being logically evolved from necessary principles, without at the same time ignoring the fact that there are multitudes of human beings in whom the sense of beauty is either dormant or depraved It may be possible to show that religion has in it the highest necessity—a necessity involved in the very nature of reason." (J Caird: *An Intro-*

duction to the *Philosophy of Religion*, P. 75). The nature of man is such as to feel constantly an urge towards a God that takes up different forms to suit different temperaments of men, taken individually or collectively. The different types of faiths are all but various responses to these different kinds of cries of human hearts for a God. The faculties of thinking, feeling and willing that make up human mind, as it is, are ever making an approach towards their respective ideals of Truth, Beauty and Goodness that, in their turn, ever elude grasp and apprehension. Knowledge always points to more and more of knowledge, beauty to more beauty and lastly good to greater good. In fact, the Triad is by nature self-surpassable. Else, it loses its ideality. But for that, it does not mean that it is simply a mirage having no actual existence anywhere. A rational mind cannot for long run after a phantom, however delightful it might be. So it must be actual somewhere and somehow, and that is in God. As the human mind is not a mere sum-total of the faculties of cognition, emotion and volition, so God is not the sum-total of Truth, Beauty and Goodness simply. He is an organic whole of which these are all but limbs or attributes, as it were. The relation between these two organic realities, man and God, as is evident in religion, equally admits of organic growth. The superiority and inferiority of one religion to the other are indications of higher and lower growth of religion as an organism, the former transcending the latter in respect of the growth of something new in it, which is not found in the latter and which does not so much annul as absorb all that are found valuable in the lower or the lowest. In putting the above argument in a different form, it may be stated that man by nature is both finite and infinite at the same time. As akin to God, he is infinite.

As an individual personal being in and of the world of matter, he is finite. There is evidently, therefore, a logical necessity in the finite to become the infinite and that speaks for religion. "To show the necessity of religion..." writes J. Caird, "is to show that the religious relation... the transcendence of all that is finite and relative and the elevation of the finite spirit into communion with an Infinite and Absolute Spirit... is a thing which is involved in the very nature of man What we have to show is not only that the finite mind may, but that it must rise to the knowledge of God." (Ibid, P. 79). Again, by way of contrast with material and other finite things of the world, that limit one another in space and that are capable of being mechanically and externally related, man as a spiritual and self-conscious being, appears to be all-pervasive in a different sense. His relation to things outside him is not one of externality and mechanism, but one of internality and organism. With the enlargement of the vista of knowledge, there is an automatic enlargement of the self too. In knowing a thing he feels his identity with the thing that he knows. In a knowledge-situation, "It is not only the revelation of the world to the observing mind, but of the observing mind to itself. We not only see the mirror of nature, but we see ourselves in it." Man, by nature rational, has an urge for the truth, which he incessantly seeks. The more he knows, the more he enlarges himself, and the more does he feel his oneness with the infinite. The ideal can never become actual, for in that case, it loses its ideality. So the quest for the Infinite is through infinite time, for the Infinite can never be exhausted. But at every step ahead, there is more and more of light and bliss. And this is the religion of a man who takes to the path of knowledge or *Jnana-marga*. The finitude

in him, insufficient and incomplete as it is, always craves for the attainment of the Infinite, that is always potentially present in him. "In the nature of a man, as an intelligent self-conscious being, there is that which forces him to rise above what is finite and to find rest nowhere short of the infinite." (Ibid, P. 80). And this is what we mean by religion in a man.

THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Philosophy is a dispassionate and comprehensive study of the universe at large. There is nothing that is outside its dominion. Sciences, material, vital and mental or, in short, physical and metaphysical—all come within the orbit of the philosophical investigations. Dr. Caird has very aptly summed this contention up in a few of the sentences in his *Philosophy of Religion*. "There is no province of human experience, there is nothing in the whole realm of reality, which lies beyond the domain of philosophy, or to which philosophical investigation does not extend." (*Philosophy of Religion*, P. 3) In this sense, religion too as an aspect of human experience, comes within its orbit. As the universe is an organism and as no limb can be studied in isolation from the rest, for dismemberment means death of the limb, the investigation into the realm of religious experiences, cut away from the rest of the fields of study, specially from those allied to religion is, for all philosophical purposes, a fruitless attempt and for that not worthy of being taken up for consideration. Directly or indirectly, all branches of studies are, more or less, interrelated, and none can be known properly in segregation from the rest. "Philosophical treatment of religion is not a simple process. It involves psychology, epistemology, ethics and metaphysics ... in every case the religious thinker is dependent on the work already done in these provinces ... A purely religious philosophy (independent of them) is not a workable conception (for) in striving to understand religion, it is also necessary to look beyond it."

(Galloway: *Philosophy of Religion*, P. 44.) As in religion, the relation between man and God is more mental than physical and primarily spiritual, the psychological questions like what mind is, how it experiences the objective phenomena of the world, or how it reacts on the world outside, naturally crop up for consideration. So do come the questions like the possibility, conditions and limits of human knowledge (Epistemological), the freedom of man, the immortality of the soul, moral end or ends (Ethical), the true nature of the human self vis-a-vis that of the Universal self, the relation between the two, etc., (Metaphysical). These are, to quote a few out of the many, the problems—psychological, epistemological, ethical and lastly, metaphysical—that form the items of business, besides many others, for the philosophy of religion to tackle or that pertain to the scope thereof. To them may be added the purely religious problems like the beginning and growth of religion, the nature of God, His relation to man and the world, religious consciousness, grounds for the belief in the existence of God, compatibility of the existence of evil with a good God, etc. It studies religion as a universal phenomenon of human experience without identifying itself with any of the existing creeds—Christianity, Mahomedanism, Hinduism, and others. It proceeds with an open mind, and examines the validity or invalidity of the religious doctrines or dogmas that come its way through the instrumentality of reason. If they can stand the test, they are accepted, if not, rejected. It is indeed an independent study of the facts of religious experiences, gathered by the different religions of the world. Here *Philosophy of Religion* differs from *Theology* or the *Science of Religion* which too, although in a limited sense, is itself a philosophy. Its business rests with the philosophical

justification of the contentions of the religion to which it belongs. Naturally, therefore, the theologies are many. They clash and often contradict one another's philosophical contentions. Theology is just like a paid Pandit (learned man) whose only business is to give a rational justification for whatever his master does. "The proper office of Theology is not to criticise the religious experience ... but rather to deal with that experience and report what is implied in it." (Galloway: *The Philosophy of Religion*, P. 47.) Unlike the Philosophy of Religion, it enjoys only limited freedom. The former is universal in outlook, and the latter is limited in vision. The one is rational in leanings, and the other is emotional-cum-rational, for it deals with the rationalisation of the faith, it supports. But for that, there need be no antagonism between the two, if only theology refrains from occasional excursions into the realm of the philosophy of religion, or indulges in metaphysical speculations beyond what strictly relates to the cultus it supports. Within its own sphere, the theology or the science of religion has its utility. The reflective nature of man cannot, for all time to come, remain satisfied with the traditional doctrines which, for its acceptance, must be reflected upon and given some sort of rational justification. And that is what theology does. Again, if faith, instead of being given the status of immutable and unalterable truth, far above the ravages of time, is conceived as a postulate—and all sciences and philosophy have postulates to start with—the difference that shall still persist between the philosophy of religion and theology will only be one of degree and not of kind. They may very well go together. (See Galloway: *The History of the Philosophy of Religion*, PP. 51-52).

RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS


It means consciousness of the phenomena that relate to the spiritual and religious pursuits of man. They are analysable into three different elements, viz. man, God and the manner in which communion between the two happens. In theism the question of the existence of man and God admits of little controversy. As for the nature of relationship subsisting between the two, the theists differ in their opinion. Conventionally mind or consciousness is supposed to have three ways of approach to reality or realities and they are cognition, emotion and volition. Guided by the habitual propensity or tendency that dominates, the theists as also the philosophers, in many cases if not in all, take either of them as the only path leading to God in heaven. For the rationalists the essence of religion lies in thought, i.e., thought and being are identical. Any attempt to segregate one from the other or to split reality up into essence and appearance, inner and outer, substance and attribute, mind and matter, and lastly God and the world, is bound to end in false distinction and arbitrary abstraction. "Natur hat weder kern noch schale." God as the universal and the absolute reason, by a process of evolution, manifests Himself in and through the diversities of the world and becomes self-conscious only in man. "Hegel does not hold that God or the Logical Idea exists as a self-conscious logical process before the creation of the world,—He cannot be conscious without a world; — He is a developing God and becomes fully self-conscious only in the minds of human beings, who make explicit the logical-dialectical process that lies implicit in the universal absolute reason."

(Thilly: History of Philosophy, P. 471) Man is, therefore, both man and God at the same time. When each man is a God, descended into human body, the religion for him is but the realisation of his own self. "Know thyself" or *Atmanam biddhi* is the eternal call made by God to the devoted souls, hungering for salvation. The cognitive process leading to the knowledge of one's identity with his God is in the Hindu philosophy called the *Jnana-marga* or the path of knowledge, synonymous with what in the west is called Rationalism. There are other two *Margas* called *Bhakti* and *Karma Margas* corresponding to the emotion and volition of the human mind. For a *Bhakta* or a devotee, feeling plays a prominent part in his attitude towards his God. He deprecates rationalism as a path leading to God. On account of the subject-object polarities in a knowing situation, he feels there can be no union between the knower and the known or the man and God. In knowing God, the logical thought must culminate in intuitive feeling wherein the polarities of thought eventually wither out. It is a common experience that it is in love only that the two souls come closer to each other than in any other imaginable psychic disposition, caused either by cognition or by volition. In love alone, the lovers may lose one's own identity into that of the other without reservation. What is true in the case of ordinary human beings, is more true in the case of man's relation to his God, in whom he finds his own self fully realised. The protagonists of the Feeling theory in the west, like Lotze, Schliermacher, etc., opine that man is religious not by virtue of thinking correctly nor by willing rightly but by virtue of a simple emotion of love and affection that he or she bears unto his or her God. Had divinity been answerable to intellect and volition alone, the ignorant

and the weak should or could have no religion. The Love theory has reached its climax or consummation in the Vaisnav-cult of the Hindus. Love has been classified into five different kinds, commensurate with the degree of intensity and the nature of the devotion or attachment that a devotee has for his deity. They are *Santa*, *Dyasa*, *Sakhya*, *Batsalya* and lastly *Madhura*. The terms, as stated above, are indicative of the gradual unfoldment of the petals of the flower of love till at last it reaches its full bloom in *Madhura bhava*, that baffles logical definition. The ideal love is, for the average, ever an ideal to follow but scarcely an actual, amenable to human susceptibility. Sree Radha is supposed by the Vaisnavas to be the personification of this celestial love. At the start in *Santa bhava*, the lover, although undisturbed by the storm of passions, is dazzled more by the glamour of the Lord than charmed by His personal charm. There remains a barrier keeping one away from the other. In *Dasya bhava*, the barrier is, to a considerable degree, removed, for here, as a servant, the man gets into touch with his God and serves Him. In *Sakhya bhava*, the contact is still closer. As friends, they are equal and like equals they treat. They love and often quarrel with each other. In *Batsalya bhava*, the sweet sentiment of filial love and affection is instrumental to the attainment of God, looked upon as a helpless child, demanding affectionate care of his parents. Mythical characters like Jasoda and Kausilla are typical representatives of the saints, following this particular path leading to liberation. The *Madhura bhava* comprises all the aforesaid four *bhavas* and is yet a push ahead. This is a sort of love, that a devoted wife feels for her husband, or to put it more accurately, that a woman feels for a person, other than her husband. In the latter

case, the intensity of love, because of natural obstacles in the way of free mixing, reaches its climax. But for a very thin veil that separates man from God and that makes mutual love possible, there is at this stage, for all spiritual purposes, complete identity between the two. In love-making, it is the heart and not the head that speaks, and it is that which responds more accurately to the call of the divine. The volitionalists, like the intellectualists and the emotionalists, have their own way of explaining the phenomena of religious consciousness. Since the days immemorial, there is in man a constant cry, often vague, for something to get, that ever escapes human grasp. That something in course of time and enlightenment attains to the status of God, in whom he finds all his yearnings fulfilled. The entire situation is symptomatic of an urge that goads a man on to his God. This inward motive for the realisation of God gets its outward expressions in the forms of worship, rites, sacrifice, prayer, etc. In the modern age, Kant, Fichte, etc., are the chief protagonists of this theory. In the East, it bears analogy, although not in all respects, with the *Karmavad* or *Karmayoga* of the Hindus. Every man in the world has a definite station in life which enjoins upon him certain specific duties to perform. To carry them out for the sake of them alone, with no selfish end in view, is the truth that *Karmayoga* preaches. These selfless activities will eventually bring him salvation. He will, in the words of the Gita, become *Jivan-mukta*. Truly speaking, none of the three, by itself, can speak for the entire religious consciousness in man. Mind is a unitary whole, which comprises them all and yet, like a living organism, is something more than the sum-total of thinking, feeling and willing. In any conscious pursuit, there can be no artificial separation of one aspect

of mind from the rest. The question is one of degree in respect of the predominance of one element over the remaining two. None of them is totally absent. In thought there are always, however meagre, certain elements of feeling and willing. So is it the case when either of them dominates consciousness. Thought without any love for the object thought of, that naturally springs out in some sort of outward activity, is dry and cannot long survive. Similarly, the feeling of love without the knowledge of the object of love, that stimulates activity in a lover, is empty and vague. Undiscriminated feelings admit of no discrimination. The feeling of a saint and that of a satan bear the same colour. Lastly, willing is aimless and random, unless it refers to an object of will inspiring at the same time love for it. The fact is that "man's whole psychical constitution is involved in his movement to religion." (Galloway: *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 77) The whole of the being of man is involved in his approximation towards the whole of the reality, that is God.



THE HISTORY OF RELIGION

I

History, as an intellectual pursuit, deals with the origin and the gradual growth of that of which it is a history. The history of religion, therefore, is the history of its origin in the past and its subsequent developments, culminating in what it is today, in its various forms of creeds and faiths. Nobody can say with certainty when actually the feeling of religiosity in its rudimentary form first came into existence. In all probability, it is coeval with the awakening of full consciousness in man. Religion, fundamentally a way of mental life and discipline is, in that sense, a child of mind; and as to its psychical origin different thinkers have got different interpretations to give. Without entering into the problem of whether any or all of them is or are correct, it may safely be stated here that a mental state having no corresponding objective reference, or consciousness without any object to be conscious of, is unthinkable and as such a misnomer. There are, therefore, in existence several theories with regard to religious consciousness and its objects of worship. One of them is Animism, sponsored by Taylor and thinkers of his way of thought. Here men project their own life and self into the objects of the world that strike their fancy. Big trees, high mountains, vast rivers, etc., appear to them as being inhabited by spirits akin to their own, but more powerful. These animated objects are capable of doing both harm and good to men. Religion rests on the natural anxiety of men for self-preservation, supposed to be made possible

through the appeasement of the wrath of these gods by prayer, by worship or even by flattery, if and when necessary. The gods, at this stage, are more or less embodiments of vital forces. A clear conception of a self-conscious spirit is still a far cry. Traces of this consciousness, however, are found in the theory of Ancestor-worship or Ghost-worship, advocated by Spencer and his followers. Ancestors, when dead, are deified and looked upon as family gods, concerned with the well-being of their own descendants. Although not in the sense of god-worship, the custom of *Pitri-puja* is yet in vogue amongst the Hindus. Indications there are of the belief in the existence of *Pitri-loka* or the abode of the ancestors, side by side, with the *Deva-loka* or the abode of the *Devatas* (gods); and there are, in correspondence with them, two ways of approach, viz., *Pitri-marga* and *Dava-marga* to these abodes, which men take to in accordance with their *karma*, inclination and disposition. However big or small be the merits of the Ghost-worship, it is far below the mark or standard that religion anticipates. Disembodied spirits, only because of disembodiment, are not superior in excellence to the embodied souls. The old strength and weakness that the spirit possessed, while in flesh and blood, still cling to it. It is, after all, a human spirit and not a god. Besides, this Ancestor god is parochial in tendency inasmuch as his vision, unlike that of a god, lacks universalism in outlook and his interest centers round his own descendants only, whose good is his own good and whose evil is his own evil. What happens to other beings is no concern of his. This defect, born of narrow outlook, has, to some extent, been removed or the circumference of the circle of interest widened, in the theory of Totemism, where the centre of interest has been shifted from the family

to the tribe. A Totem stands for a species of animal or plant which is the symbol of god for worship, by the tribal people. Individual animals belonging to the species may come and go but the species must persist for eternity. They may, under restriction, be slain and even eaten on the occasions of religious ceremonies on the logical assumption that it is the species and not the individual animal that is god. This theory has its brilliant exponents in a group of thinkers, headed by W. R. Smith. His book on "Religion of the Semetics" (1885) is full of advocacy for this theory as the origin or source of all religions of the world. Dr. Jevons in his book entitled "Introduction to History of Religion" (1886) accelerated considerably its future growth and development and finally detected in this theory of Totemism the germ of Monotheism or the belief in one god. Thinkers belonging to the French sociological school of thought of whom special mention may be made of E. Durkheim, while supporting this theory in principle, reorients it with a new meaning and purpose. Behind the tangibility of the totem, there is the intangible and impersonal social force that is in fact the god, claiming under compulsion, the obeisance and worship of the tribal people. A step forward, and we come across the conception of *Mana* that is an all-pervading and imperceptible power, working within and outside the world of objects. Parochialism thus gives way to universalism. Anything striking in men or in things other than men is an indication of the presence of *Mana* in them. The success or failure of a man in life depends on the condition of how much of *Mana* he possesses or does not possess. There is a sense of awe or helplessness in the presence of this mysterious and indefinable power, which people, in their own interest, propitiate

in an attitude of religious reverence and self-surrender for the attainment of their cherished goals. This is the type of religion that Dr. Marett, D. M. Edwards etc., presume to be the most ancient religion, of which other religions are but legitimate offspring. With regard to the birth of these types of religions, they support a process of evolution, if of course it can be so called at all, diametrically opposite to the process, we have hitherto followed. The entire structure is placed upside down—*Mana*, Totem, Ghost and lastly Animism. The sole argument in favour of this contention is that the Totem, the Ghost and the animated objects are only meaningless verbiage, but for the existence of this all-pervading permanent reality—*Mana*—that knows no birth or death. The Totem as a species is simply an abstract name having no denotation unless taken in the sense of the suprasensuous force expressing itself in the individuals of the species. Similarly a ghost survives bodily death because of its existence somewhere, immune from the laws and control of the decaying world, and that is possible through its participation in the above force or *Mana*. Lastly, the object that is animated, is animated by something other than the object. That something, in all probability, is what is meant by ghost of the ancestors whom the primitive people worshipped as god. If we follow this line of thought, we may go up or down to the lofty conception of the Absolute or the *Brahman* as the first and the foremost presupposition of all religions and faiths. There is nothing wrong in this line of thinking, for verily nothing can come out of nothing. The Absolute is there at the start, although as a promise only. Philosophically considered, this view is all right. But history is not philosophy. The former deals with the seen and the latter speculates on the unseen. One

is bound up within the limitations of the tangible and the other peeps into the intangible. From the perspective of history, therefore, the line of Animism, Ghost-worship, Totemism and lastly Mana, as we have stated above, is probably justifiable.

II

RELIGION—NATIONAL AND UNIVERSAL

The term "probably justifiable" is significant in the sense that none can vouch for the exact chronological development of religious consciousness in man from its dim inception right upto the period when it comes within the comprehensible range of the scientific or philosophic speculation. Till that period is reached, the investigator must depend, more or less, on guess, based on the calculation of probability. Only such a probability can our contention claim and nothing more. Evolution does not mean always a march ahead or progress. It has its retrogressions too that give it, eventually, a stronger push ahead. Tribal religion or totemism, likewise, had sustained a lapse into what we called Fetishism and Polydaemonism. Fetishism is derived from a Portuguese term, "Feitico," meaning a charm. The charm inheres in an inanimate object because it is, say for example, a stone, inhabited by a spirit. But for the presence of the spirit, the object in itself is without any charm and use and can be cast away. People used to wear it to avoid misfortune and to welcome fortune. Their god is thus a means to an end and the end is their physical well-being. Reverence for god for the sake of god alone is absent. Polydaemonism is symptomatic of the stage

progressively ahead of the stage of Fetishism. It believes in the worship of many spirits that people the world. They are found attached to the objects of the world — small or big. There is an hierarchy of spirits in respect of power and importance in conformity with the object they represent. The small spirits stand for small objects, namely, tree, bird, river, etc. The big spirits belong to the bigger objects of nature, say, the sky, the moon, the ocean, etc. Out of the multitude of spirits, the primitive men single out those only for worship that are powerful enough to do them harm or good. Gradually, although unconsciously, they proceed from the bigger to the biggest of belief, that is, to the belief in the existence of the supreme Spirit which is the Spirit of all spirits. It sounds like Monotheism, the full implications of which are unknown to the tribes. It is an idea, unconsciously formed without being awakened to full consciousness. In recognition of the conception of the supreme being, Andrew Lang has gone so far as to say in his book entitled, "The Making of Religion" that "certain low savages are as monotheistic as some Christians; they have a supreme being." (2nd Edi., P. 167). In one sense, it is true, but in the other, it appears to be an exaggeration of fact. This idea was in a nebulous state and could little evoke a feeling of humility and worship in the savage. The conception of the supreme being in the sense the Christians take it, is too remote and lofty for him to take full recognition of. It is an absentee spirit, if a spirit at all. Psychologically considered, the conception of spirits, as in Polydaemonism, owes its origin to dream experiences. The savage imagines his soul to be a shadowy image of his body that, in dream, leaves his body and roams about. Death occurs when the soul does not return to

the body. The spirit, according to the polydaemonist, is but the shadowy soul, humanlike and projected into the objects of nature; and when thus projected, it lacks the purity and the sanctity of a dematerialised reality that is beyond contamination. Polydaemonism, as a theory, has certain other defects too, that make it fall far short of what a religion demands. The relation between a man and the spirit, is one of fear and not of love. Primitive people felt that they were left at the mercy of the spirits, ever hostile to their interest. Like a man in the tribe, who got only a very dim sense of selfhood, inasmuch as he was but a speck in the machine or a means to an end, the end being the solidarity of the tribe as a whole, the polydaemonic spirits too, in conformity with the level of perfection, the tribal mind had reached, lacked proportionately in personality and other virtues, that could ordinarily be demanded of a God. Tribal spirits like tribal people are narrow in their outlook. They belong to their respective tribes where members of other tribes should have had no access to. As the tribes are in occasional clash with one another, so their gods too are for the safety and the victory of their own tribes. But in spite of the defects of Polydaemonism, hitherto enumerated, it has certain merits of its own, that should not be allowed to pass unheeded. For the first time do we observe a world of spirits, detached from and independent of the world of matter. Nature-worship is thereby replaced by spirit-worship. Spirit-worship, however dim and vague, at this stage, is just the start of the lofty conception of spirit held by the idealists. Loyalty to one's own self is subordinated to the loyalty to the tribe, and it is a prelude to the modern ethical standard of each for all and none for himself alone. The vision, thus enlarged, gradually breaks

through; as of necessity, the fences of the tribes, the barricades of the nations and eventually steps into what we call universalism in outlook. The process is gradual. The tribes combine themselves either for self-defence against a common enemy or for the reason of many tribes being conquered by one of more powerful tribes. Whatever be the case, it led to the formation of a nation. More developed as it is, as an organisation, it has a more developed type of religion. Totemic gods are replaced by National gods. Polydaemonism yields place to polytheism. Vague and formless spirits of the tribal religion are elevated to the status of gods in polytheism. They are anthropomorphised and like men are given proper names. Away from the world, they dwell in heaven, and yet are in touch with their respective departments, say, agriculture, art, war, love etc., pertaining to the earth. Theirs is not a reign of terror but of love and justice. Ethics and not politics is the call of the hour. Ethical order and not the selfish warfare is what the spirit of the nation calls for. Gods are ethicised and appear as personifications of this or that of the moral virtues or excellences, that human minds adore or crave for. For example, in the Vedas *Indra* stands for valour, *Varun* for the element of water, *Yama* the god of death, for the dispensation of justice. Similar gods are found in other countries too. Relation that subsists between a man and his god is one of reverence, prayer and sacrifice on the part of the former and love and blessings on the part of the latter. Prayer is a mental attitude or a process that links the prayerful up with his deity in an atmosphere of spiritual ecstasy. The sacrifice likewise is an external deed on the part of man to please his god for what he has done or is expected to do for him. *Bhajan and Pujan* or prayer and sacrifice go together

for the one supplements the other. Feeling blossoms forth into physical actions, which, on their part, chisel or accentuate feelings. From the point of view of merits, prayer is far superior to the cult of sacrifice, and it is through the prayer mainly, if not solely, that the worship of many gods, as in polytheism, is replaced, step by step, by the worship of one God, as in monotheism. The movement towards this unification is discernible in the political theory like what is called monarchism. Analogous to a human monarch, the supreme God is the king of all gods, who are dependent on Him and for that, cease to be independent of or equal to Him. The next step, in the words of Max Muller, is Henotheism. It is a kind of faith in which a worshipper, on account of his exuberance of feeling and deep attachment for the deity he likes and loves, makes his god wide and universal enough to absorb all other gods within His fold in course of his esoteric intercourse with Him. Soon after the ecstasy is over, the same god comes back to his original status of one God among many. It is indeed a tendency towards Monotheism, although not Monotheism itself. It appears to have reached its fullest development in the religion of the Upanishads wherein Brahman, the One without a second, has been used both in the sense of God (Monotheism) and the Absolute (Monism). Taken in the latter sense, Brahman admits of no religion for religion stands on duality — the worshipper and the worshipped, — and there is no duality in the Absolute. On the contrary, religion, if it is worth the name, should have nothing to do with anything less than the Absolute. The chasm is ostensibly unsurpassable, which actually it is not. If the most real is the most perfect and if the existence of man with his nisus towards god is a fact to be reckoned with

in the phenomenal level of our existence, there must be some way out of the puzzle. In the words of Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, "The monistic conception is also capable of developing the highest religious spirits. Only prayer to God is replaced by contemplation of the supreme Spirit that rules the world, the love that thrills it in an unerring but yet lavish way. The sympathy between the mind of the part and that of the whole is productive of the highest religious emotion. Such an ideal love of God and meditation on the plentitude of beauty and goodness flood the mind with the cosmic emotion." (Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 98). This is the religion of the Intellectuals philosophically justified. This is the type of the Universal religion that the world is in need of. Even an atheist may, with a little alteration of words here and there, in the quotation above, find a religion of his own. And it is amusing to find that the definition, as given by Bertrand Russell, of the Religion of the Intellectuals, agrees considerably in essence with the definition as given by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, as per quotation above. Universal religion is a logical step ahead of the national religion. However broad, a national religion, only because it is national, must have the stamp of nationalism all around it and as such, it is limited within the four walls of that particular nation. It is more or less an official religion, conformity to whose formalities is binding on all, who belong to the nation. Individual susceptibility or choice is little cared for. This is indeed a challenge to the dignity of man and he naturally resents it. He must have his freedom of thought and action, particularly in respect of his relation to the Supreme; and therein we find the key to the rise of universalism in religion. In addition to this

psychical and philosophical background, there is a cosmic necessity behind the birth of universal religion. Like the tribal barrier, the national barrier too, as a matter of course, dropped down, leaving sufficient space for the universal religion to blossom forth. According to W. D. M. Edwards, there are only three universal religions in the world and chronologically put, they are Buddhism, Christianity and lastly Mahomedanism or Islam. If a call to the general public to embrace a particular faith, in preference to all others, that are either dismissed as heathenic idolatrous or at any rate, as pantheistic, is the only *sine qua non* of universalism, the religions that encourage proselytism are undoubtedly universalistic. But surely, intolerance or non-recognition of faiths other than one's own cannot be an appropriate synonym of universalism, that indicates unity in diversity, a common feature that appeals to all hearts. But for the deliberate silence on the question of the existence of a permanent spiritual being, that underlies all changes, Buddhism, based as it is on ethical values, could have better been called a universal religion. These religions, however, appear to be more revealed than universal, as supposed by Edwards and thinkers of his way of thought.

III

RELIGION—NATURAL AND REVEALED

Cryptically stated, Natural religions are man-made and Revealed religions are God-made. The former, the human minds arrive at on an earnest and sincere speculations of the mysteries of the world and the latter

descends upon man as blessings from above through the agency of a few persons chosen by God. Such a person is called an Avatar by the Hindus, the Son of God by the Christians and the Dost or friend by the Muslims. Whatever be the difference in name, that which they give to mankind, in conformity with the time and place whereto they belong, as the gift of God, has to be accepted without questioning. Faith in and not a critical estimate of what they say is the gateway to heaven or a credential wherewith to call on the Almighty. Faith is not, for that, opposed to reason. Belief cannot certainly thrive on what is irrational. None can believe in an elephant passing through the hole of a needle nor can imagine a square peg in a round hole of equal dimension. On the contrary, reason, without any objective faith in what is reasoned about, is a misnomer. Reason and faith go together and the one is complementary to the other. The world of phenomena, philosophically studied, naturally raises questions on noumenon or God and His relation to the world and man. What philosophy offers as answers to the queries are, more or less, problematic and hypothetical, whose authenticity is proved by revelations made by God Himself, through the seers who have not only heard of but have also seen the truth, as it is. The philosophers are like the highly educated spinsters who can write out a beautiful thesis on motherhood without any personal feeling of what it is like. The seers, on the other hand, are the mothers who have felt, for themselves, what motherhood means. To get at the truth, we must have faith in what a mother says, but at the same time, we must read through what a philosopher writes. Philosophy and religion, or in other words, religion natural and revealed, are like two sides of the same coin. None can dispense with the other.

RELIGION ON THE WEIGHING BALANCE

(A)

REALISM—OLD AND NEW

Of the several instinctive impulses that a man possesses, one is his anxiety to check and thereby to get satisfied as to the authenticity of that which he likes and loves. Money is an asset that men love and long for and for that in all transactions like buying and selling, the parties concerned are always on the alert to see for themselves that no counterfeit coin may imperceptively slip into their purse. It is tossed upside down and downside up several times to avoid any such eventuality. Negatively or positively, religion is undoubtedly the chief concern of human life. The fact is that the man is a born theist; he is an atheist on speculation. Even if one is inclined to reject it, he will have to adduce reasons in support thereof, or in other words, he will have to weigh its genuineness or otherwise on the balance of reason which, if found wanting, justifies his rejection; if not, religion stands. In the history of human speculative thoughts, Naturalism, Agnosticism, Positivism, Marxism, etc., are all attempts at such a rejection. Naturalism is a common name for all thoughts that thrive on the affirmation of the independent objectivity of the world. The world of matter is not dependent on mind but the mind is dependent on matter. Naturalism may be compared with a genus of which materialism under the name of Realism old and new is, so to say, the two species. Old Realism again falls into two different phases of upheaval, one preceding the

scholastic movement in the mediaeval period and the other following it. The pre-scholastic philosophy reveals a state of child-like simplicity or innocence. It is a philosophy more of faith than of reason. "The existence of objects *per se*, out of all relations to mind," or the knowledge thereof, is a settled fact that requires no proof. This or that element of the world is regarded as the fundamental reality behind all objects of perception. It is an ontological or dogmatic assertion with no corresponding rational justification behind it. It cannot explain how the one descends into the many or how the many ascend to the one. It is indeed a case of unconscious onslaught made on God and religion from the ontological front that lacks in any logical basis. Post-scholastic realism, on the contrary, is a conscious philosophy in which the subject and the object appear in full independence. So ontologically old Realism ends in dualism, and epistemologically in representationism. In view of these differences between the two, some thinkers are inclined to regard pre-scholastic period as dealing with crude realism, which may not be called philosophy at all. But to us, it appears that the distinction between the two is only of name and degree. Post-scholastic realism is, in truth, the pre-scholastic realism more fully established. There is a continuity between the two with breaks no where. The former differs from the latter to the extent that an adult differs from a child. In spite of this difference in growth, they are, nevertheless, one in entertaining a common end in view. And that is their insistence, more or less, on the independent existence of objects than on the direct perception thereof. The epistemological failure, on the part of the old realists, to account for the interaction between the mind and the matter except through representations

(ideas) is largely due to the ontological attitude that it takes up against an equally ontological philosophy of the old idealists, whose basic and fundamental principle is the Absolute Mind and not the Absolute Experience which is, on the contrary, the essence of the philosophy of the Neo-idealists. Old and New Realism are the corresponding reactions against the Old and New Idealism. If the Old Realism is ontologically-tinged, New realism is epistemologically-minded. It is concerned more with the directness of perception than with the independence of objects which, to it, is a settled fact. With their advocacy for the externality of relations between the terms and for the complete obliteration of the distinction between mind and matter both being made up of entities, which are neither physical nor mental or, as a matter of fact, which do not possess any thinghood at all, the Neo-realists, both English and American, attempt to give a deathblow to Idealism, old and new, with its progeny of gods and religions. How far they have succeeded, it is for the metaphysicians to gauge. But we do feel, however, that conceptions of God and religion are too embedded in human hearts to be so easily shaken off. The philosophy of S. Alexander and that of a few more neo-realistic thinkers bear testimony to our feelings. As philosophical doctrines are no monopoly of any particular nation or country, the system of thought known as materialism was in some form or other always present in India also. Carvaka, whether a man or a common name for all materialists, is the most ancient propounder of this theory in India and, it may be, in the world.

(B)

CARVAKA

What Hume was to Kant and other thinkers of his time in the west, Carvaka was to the theistic thinkers of India. Like the modern Neo-realists, Carvaka starts philosophy with Epistemology. Perception is the only source of knowledge. By a thorough analysis of knowledge, he shows that man can know nothing beyond what is given by the senses. Inference is rejected on the ground that there is no possibility of establishing a universal or *Vyapti* relation between the middle and the major terms in a syllogism and for that no leap from the known to the unknown is logically possible. Testimony, as a source of knowledge, bears no better fate. Faith in the words of Authorities is permissible in so far as they are within the range of perception. Any statement about things outside the above range is not free from doubt and error and as such, like inference, has to be rejected outright. In an epistemological background, as above, the only metaphysical reality, if metaphysical at all, that is acceptable to Carvaka, is matter. It is composed of four elements, viz., air, fire, water and earth. Of the traditional *Panca bhutas*, one element called ether is left out on account of its being imperceptible. What we call mind or soul is a by-product of matter and is only a name given to the living body with consciousness. It is like heat generated through the friction of two otherwise cold pieces of stones. To imagine that heat remained latent in stones is to go counter to the epistemological stand that Carvaka takes up. God, survival after death, etc., are on the above ground dismissed as creations of the cunning priests, who live on the credulity and ignorance of the general mass. In

conformity with the above metaphysical theories that justify the contention that the death of the body means the death of the so-called soul too, or that nothing survives bodily death, the only ethical ideal that naturally gets response from human hearts is Hedonism. "Eat, drink and be merry" is the maxim that mankind should follow. Ordinarily, men are prone to believe that Carvaka preached Egoistic hedonism that is gross, crude and vulgar. Might be, but if Carvaka is not the name of a particular man but denotes a class of thinkers, supporting a specific system of philosophy, then there are indications to show that the *Carvakas* are more sinned against than sinning. The distinction between the *dhurta* (cunning) and the *susiksita* (cultured) *Carvakas* bears testimony to the fact that all *Carvakas* are not the advocates of gross hedonism. *Vatsyayana*, a recognised hedonist, holds up before men three desirable ends that they must endeavour to attain. They are *Dharma* (virtue), *Artha* (wealth) and *Kama* (pleasure). Insistence on the last at the cost of the other two ill-serves its own purpose. For any kind of pleasure, physical fitness and mental alertness are the two preconditions to be fulfilled. And that is possible only through self-restraint (*Bramacarya*), mental discipline (*Dharma*). Add to it *Artha* (wealth), earnable through social intercourse, and it shows that man is virtually a social creature, subordinating always his personal interest to that of others, living in the same society. Egoism is succeeded by Altruism and grossness by refinement. *Vatsyayana* truly represents Indian hedonism at its best and has gone further still in holding belief in the existence of God and life after death.

(C)

AGNOSTICISM

The credit for the invention of the term goes entirely to Prof. Huxley who coined it on the occasion of the formation of the Metaphysical Society in 1869, long after the air of the philosophical world had already got saturated with the spirit of Agnosticism. It received its first impetus from the writings of Emanuel Kant, who gave considerable stress, in his philosophy, on the limitations of human knowledge and it took up the form of a movement, only when an article entitled, "On the philosophy of the Unconditioned," written by William Hamilton, was brought out in print in the *Edinburgh Review* in the year 1829. Although it started originally as an attack on the theistic philosophy of Victor Cousin, as a movement itself, it stands mid-way between Theism and Atheism. It does never say that there is no God. Its only assertion is that He is beyond rational knowledge and hence He is ever unknown and unknowable. The central attitude remaining the same, the Agnostic thinkers of the 19th century slightly differ, one from the other, in respect of their specific approach to the problem. By way of developing the views of Hamilton, H. L. Mansel, in his Bampton lecture on "The limits of religious thoughts" (1858) stressed on the rational irreconcilability of the attributes of infinitude and absoluteness being simultaneously ascribed to God, the one affirming time and the other denying it, or the one remaining within time and the other beyond it. For him, however, there are still avenues other than rational, of course not irrational, through which a man may approach his God, and that is through prayer, as in religion, and through moral deeds, as in ethics. They, according to him, supply suffi-

cient grounds for believing in God, although no sufficient grounds for reasoning about Him. What are stated in scriptures are to be unconditionally accepted, not as reasonable nor unreasonable but as scriptural only. Hamilton's article and its developments by Mansel were the basis of the first part of Herbert Spencer's First Principle (1862) that deals elaborately with Agnosticism. He employs the historical method in dealing with the unknowable. As in religion so in science, the tendency of men is always to proceed from the more tangible to the less tangible, from the more concrete to the less concrete, till at last they reach the realm of the unknown and the unknowable. The last word both for science and religion is all about the unknown and it is here that they both meet and lose their differences. Of the traditional Agnostic thinkers of the 19th. century, Huxley was the most outstanding one. He got wiser by the wisdom of his predecessors to which he added his own. As a scientist, he protested against dogmatism of all kinds. Agnosticism, which struck him when he was only a boy of fifteen and when, for the first time in his life, he came into touch with the writings of Hamilton, was not a creed but a method with him. In this respect, he differed substantially from his predecessors. The term Unknowability is, according to him, a taboo in the domain of science. What is not known today may be known tomorrow. New discoveries and inventions are what the scientists are all busy about, and are ever aiming at. The unknowability of God is not, on that account, a settled fact. It is always an open problem for the philosophers to tackle. But on no account, he opines, faith should be allowed to step in as a proof for the existence of God. If the existence of God is ever proved, it must be proved by reason and reason alone. All that can reasonably be

said is that, till now, He remains unknown. But for that none can vouch for His unknowability for ever.

From all that has been stated, it becomes abundantly clear that the Agnostic thinkers, if anything, are not at any rate atheistic in leanings. The assertion of the unknowability of God is, to that extent at least, an affirmation of the knowledge of God. It is known of Him that He is unknown. It is positively known of Him that His existence does not admit of rational proof. Whether known or unknown, the central figure God, in any case, persists.

(D)

POSITIVISM

The term positivism is applicable, in a wider sense, to all empirical thoughts with certain reservations here and there. For example, in the philosophies of Locke and Hume, Mathematics, and in that of Locke alone, God and Soul, have to be left out before they can assume the form of positivism. For a few of the positivist thinkers, there are metaphysical questions no doubt, but they are rejected as unanswerable. The majority of the thinkers, however, dismiss them as meaningless and sheer nonsense. Theirs is not the question of the "why" of a thing but only the "how" of it. They do not bother about the essence of things but only with how things, as objects for investigation by different sciences, are related, one with the other. In a narrower and conventional sense, positivism is a philosophical doctrine of which Saint Simon was the founder or originator and Auguste

Comte was the chief propounder or proponent. It came as a counter-attack on the Eclecticism of Victor Cousin, T. Jouffreoy and Royar Coffar, which too, on its part, was a reaction equally against the materialistic and sensationalistic philosophy of Condillac, Hablock, etc., that had exercised a tremendous influence on the body-mind of the French people, during the period of the French Revolution. The excess of liberalism, as in sensationalism, led to the opposite extreme of authoritativeness as in Eclecticism. Positivism came as a balancing factor in between the two extremes. For it, liberalism means liberty of thought and deed with proper self-restraint; and authority is the acknowledgment of the supremacy of human intellect as the only source of human knowledge. The verdict of the intellect is that man is the central figure, whose good is the good of all sciences and philosophies. The government is for man and man is not for the government. The religion is for man and man is not for religion. Miseries in human life are positive facts to reckon with and there must be a positive philosophy prescribing positive remedies for them. The French Revolution had no doubt brought the hitherto, more or less, unknown freedom to all, but the universal happiness, consequent mainly upon the equal distribution of property, power, culture, etc., was still a distant cry. The aforesaid happiness could only be attained through a thorough remodelling of the social structure, based on enlightenment as a gift of philosophy. The reform of society presupposes a knowledge of social laws which, in their turn, necessitate a world-view in tune with the reformed society. This world-view only philosophy can offer. Comte devoted his life to the working out of such a philosophy. Positive knowledge, which he holds up as

the ideal in his philosophy, passes through a historical process. The process admits of three stages—the theological, the metaphysical and lastly the positive, each of which has its practical utility in its corresponding social institution. The first and the second stages stand respectively for childhood and youth in the process of the development of thought, which reaches its culmination in positivism, still in making. The first two try to find out the essence behind the sensed, while the third is committed to the sensed alone. It aims at the unification of all sciences and scientific laws available through experience. All sciences are classified in accordance with their complexity and importance, leading to the most important science of sociology that is about to enter, Comte hopes, into the stage of positivism. Positivism anticipates a type of society, where there is no misery, and where each person is for the good of the rest, or all is for all. This means that a man must follow in life an ideal and the ideal is the perfection of man in society. This is the ethics of positivism, and we may say, its religion too. There is no supernatural God living away from man. Humanity is the great Being whom all must worship as God. The so-called revealed religions are bound, as human thought advances, to be superseded by human-worship.

What Comte writes about his object of worship is poetic enough to rouse pleasant sentiment in human minds, but it is doubtful if it can stand the test of human reason. Man as man is a mixture of good and evil. However perfect he might be, animality in him still lingers and cannot in totality be wiped out. What we seek through religious sentiments, prayer etc., is what is infinitely pure, infinitely good and infinitely true and beau-

tiful. Perfect perfection is not possible for an imperfect man to attain. Besides, with his method of empiricism, he cannot talk of humanity which is as abstract and imperceptible as God is. As regards the question of self-revelation of God, the answer is that if the existence of God is a fact, His revelation is equally a fact and cannot be denied. It is a necessity both for God and man alike. Like a father unto his son, God is god only when He stands in relation to man. Equally, limited as he is, a man cannot get into touch with the Infinite unless the Infinite, in Its boundless mercy for man, reveals Itself to him. Furthermore, His revelation does not take place once for all. He will come, whenever there is the need of His coming. It reminds us of two aphorisms in the Gita, testifying to the same truth.

*"Yada-Yada hi dharmasya glanir bhavati Bharat
Abhyutthanam adharmasya tada 'tmanam srijamy aham."*

Whenever there is decline of righteousness and rise of unrighteousness, O Bharata (Arjuna) then I send forth (create incarnate) Myself.

(The Bhagavadgita, Chapter IV sloka 7.

Translated by S. Radhakrishnan).

*"Paritranaya sadhunam vinasaya ca duskrtam
Dharmasamsthapanarthaya sambhavami yuge-yuge."*

For the protection of the good, for the destruction of the wicked and for the establishment of righteousness, I come into being from age to age.

(The Bhagavadgita, Chapter IV, sloka 8.

Translated by S. Radhakrishnan).

(E)

MARXISM

Karl Marx was born on May 5, 1818, in a Jewish family. His parents were converted Christians, baptized as protestants and led the life of orthodox Christians all through. Naturally his childhood and boyhood passed in an atmosphere, surcharged with religiosity. Ironically enough, in later days, he turned out the strongest of the opponents of God and religion and till this day, more than half of the world is under his ideological domination. Originally he was a student of Hegel, whose philosophy he interpreted in his own way. For him there is no supernatural "Idea" behind the natural or the actual world. The basis or matrix of the world is matter and not mind. Mind is the modification of the brain and has no independent existence. In short, psychosis is identical with neurosis. With this initial difference, Karl Marx is, more or less, in agreement with his master in respect of the rest of his philosophy, reoriented in the light of the aforesaid difference. Both for Hegel and Marx, dialectic is the process of the world. For the former, it is spiritual and with the latter, it is material. In the historical movement onward, the contradictions, latent in the positive and negative factors (thesis and antithesis) of all events of the world, are all resolved in a synthesis by an urge which, for Hegel, is purposive and for Marx is blind and automatic, assuming an economic bias on and from the feudal level of human existence. Of all the impulses, the impulse for self-existence or self-preservation is the strongest one. In the pre-feudal period, when people used to live in communes with joint ownership of the food and other scanty necessities of

life that they jointly procured, there could happen nothing like the exploitation of the one by the other or of a group of persons by another group of persons for his or their own interest or self-sustenance in supersession of others'. Selfishness as a fell disease broke out first with the appearance of the feudal lords on the stage. They appropriated or rather misappropriated the entire cultivatable lands all to themselves, using the peasant class as slaves or as tools to grow food for their own use either in consumption or in trade. The actual growers of food had often to go without food or with as much of food as was absolutely necessary to keep their bodies and minds together to meet the ends of their lords. The domination of the many by a few or the exploitation of the vast mass of population by an insignificant minority becomes all the more glaringly visible when, in the modern age, feudalism is replaced by industrialism. The centre of interest is shifted from the feudal lords to the capitalists, the bourgeois occupying the key-position both in the society and the state. In fact, both the society and the state are their own creations, and are subservient to their own interest, inasmuch as they supply machineries to keep the proletariat under subjugation. Of these machineries, ecclesiasticism or religion is the most powerful one. Primarily a social gift, it thrives on state support. In addition to all other agencies, social or political, working as instrumental to class domination, it, in its own peculiar way, under the pretence of religious obligations, or sometimes on the promise of divine rewards in the life to come after death, coerces the innocent workers to take to very hard labour, often unbearable, for the enhancement of production in factories, that may add more to the already existing big capital of the

capitalists. Excess in production, consequent reduction of staff and workers for the maintenance of high price-level, rivalry in capturing the markets of the world, are the chief factors that eventually lead to a conflagration ending, in due course, in the establishment of a classless society, akin largely to the commune of the pre-historic age. As a historical necessity, based on dialecticism, it is bound to come. The question is of time alone. To hasten the birth of this classless society, the belief in God as the strongest of the impediments in the way, must have to be rooted out of the minds of the people. In the words of Karl Marx, "Religion is an opium" to lull the human beings to silence. (See Marx's criticism of Hegel's Philosophy of Law). For him therefore, "The criticism of religion is the beginning of all criticisms." In the programme of the Communist International at the sixth World Congress held in 1928, the ruling powers were advised to withdraw all state support from the church and to put an end to the influences that the church usually exercises on the systems of education, that is imparted to the children of the soil. In brief, attempts must be made to facilitate real emancipation of the toiling masses from religious prejudices by more of scientific education and anti-religious propaganda. Atheism is and must be an integral part of Marxism. So is it in positivism. But in spite of this agreement on the fundamental, there are certain differences too between the two. A marxist is as much a lover of humanity as a positivist is with the difference that, while in marxism there is no place allotted to God and religion, in positivism humanity occupies the position of God as an object of worship. Contrariwise, marxism repudiates religion not so much because it is antagonistic to God

as such but because it is an obstacle on the way to the formation of a communistic society. Atheism is not an end in itself. It is the means to an end. With the positivist, it is an end, a positive fact deserving consideration for its own sake, and in dealing with metaphysical questions, religion must be rejected outright either as a philosophical nonsense or as something incomprehensible by human intellect.

The marxists, it appears, are atheists not in faith but by accident, by certain stern necessities born of socio-economical and political exigencies, created by the creed that the marxists follow. That they were never orthodox non-believers is evident in many of their writings. For example, the German Social Democratic Party in its Erfurt Programme in 1891, stated that "Ecclesiastical and religious bodies are to be considered as private associations." It is the concern of a private life that should be allowed to pass undisturbed. This is, in all probability, the attitude of the modern marxists too towards the problems, relating to God and religion. At any rate, the present Russian tendency is a pointer to that direction. And none needs be surprised if under the compulsion of the self-same dialectic push onward, a new socio-political order emerges as a synthesis out of the combination of capitalism and Marxism as thesis and antithesis respectively. This new order of society will fulfil both but shall subserve none.

(F)

• FREUDIANISM

The most modern and the most formidable of the opponents of religion and God is Freudianism. It

bases its contention more on the analysis of the human mind than on any metaphysical doctrine for, according to Freud, religion is mythology and metaphysics is metapsychology. Originally by profession a physician, Freud happened to find out, with his friend Joseph Breuer, that physical ailments had, in many cases, their roots in psychical excitements, reducible, in all cases, to sexual urge in men and women. It is this urge that pervades and permeates the entire psychical structure in all its functional activities—good or bad, decent or indecent, sublime or vulgar. This urge, often semi-conscious, is discernible even in a child in his libidinal attraction for his mother. Here he meets with a rival in his father, whom he adores for his personality as also for giving him protection, but whom he equally hates for his interference in his love for his mother, whom he wants to monopolise all to himself. The suppression of the feeling of hate and, at the same time, augmentation of the sentiment of adoration and respect, stimulated by the sense of guilt, consequent upon hate-feeling, forms the basis on which the superstructure of all religions is built up. The father-complex felt and formed round the earthly father is finally projected to the father in heaven. The heavenly father is but the earthly father more glorified. The totemic religions, historically viewed, the most primitive of all religions, hold out a Totem, ordinarily a very strong animal, as the totemic representative of the forefathers. What we call rational or revealed, national or universal, religions are all but apt instances of psychical sublimation of the totemic cults, which at their basis, as shown above, have their origin in the phylogenetic oedipal tendencies in men and women in their childhood. The murder of Moses and Christ by their own men illus-

trates an attitude of ambivalence or fluctuation in respect of love and hate that human beings simultaneously bear unto their fathers. They kill them as rivals in their libidinous attachment for their mothers. They respect them again for they give them life and protection. Freud took interest in the phenomena of religion long before he attained adolescence. But his enquiry concerning it began from 1907, when he wrote out, for the first time, an article under the caption, "Obsessive acts and religious experiences." Subsequently, he elaborated his ideas on religion in several other writings which may thus be stated, (1) Leonardo Da Vinci (1910), (2) Totem and Taboo (1913), (3) The Future of an Illusion (1927), (4) Civilization and its Discontents (1929), (5) The New Introductory Lectures (1932), (6) Moses and Monotheism (1938). In 1, 2, 6, he elaborated his theme of father-complex ending in the belief in the heavenly father, whom people worship in religions. In 3, 4, 5, Freud has further and mainly formulated a philosophy of pessimism and despair. Confronted by the paralysing powers of the most cruel nature and in view of the inability of the fellow-beings to come to any help, Freud supports an attitude of self-surrender to the inevitabilities of life. His religion, if it is called a religion at all, in the midst of the ocean of despair, consists in seeking out truths that only science can reveal and that can give a man intellectual freedom, uniting at the same time, one man with the other in love and sympathy. Brotherhood of man and love of truths are in short the essence of his religion. Prevalent religions are but cases of mass neurosis, bound to disappear with the dawn of wisdom and knowledge.

Leaving aside the question of whether or not

religion is simply the brotherhood of man or a quest after the truths of science, his analysis of the structure of mind, supporting the theory of pan-sexualism, is only a partial interpretation of human mind. Psychoanalysis is all good within its own jurisdiction, but it does not speak for the whole truth about man and his mind. All sciences are, by nature, limited in scope. They, in all cases, point to something beyond, whereto they have had no access. Self-surpassability is in its essence. The unconscious and the conscious, the super-ego and the ego are the limits for the psycho-analyst to go up to but for that, it does not mean that the mind meets its end there. The feeling of love, for example, may have, in many cases, tinge of sexuality all around it, but there is, nevertheless, a kind of love that is above sexuality and that is pure and divine in nature. Chandidas's (a Vaisnav poet) utterances like

"Rajakini prem nikasita hem

Kama gandha tahe naie."

point to such a kind of unalloyed love which, in all cases, aims at the pleasure and happiness of the beloved at the cost and sacrifice of his or her own. The *Gopabalaks* or the *Gopabalikas* entertained such a love towards the Lord *Krisna*. It is essentially opposed to ego-centricity on the basis of which all sexual impulses thrive. In the case, referred to above, the love for the self is replaced by the love for the beloved. Egoistic hedonism dies out in preference to the altruistic one. The urge of the sex bends before the urge of the spirit. The body dwindles into insignificance in the presence of the effulgence of the soul within. In a situation like this, it is only the instance of one spirit having intercourse with another, the body being given recognition only in so far as it manifests the spirit in it. The

contents of the entire *Srimad-Bhagavatam* and particularly the invocations of the Brahmin ladies, while feeding hungry *Krisna* and his friends with sweets, fruits, etc., bear ample testimony to the fact that they love *Krisna* not so much for his body as for the spirit that *Krisna* possesses (Skandah X Section XXIII). It is the type of simple and pure love, uncontaminated by any evil motive, that ties one man up with his God in religion, and not any kind of oedipus complex or libidinal desire, as Freud wants to prove. Furthermore, Freud, by his analysis of mind, could give some sort of explanation, right or wrong, in respect of theistic faiths, existent in the world, but in respect of monistic thoughts like those of Spinoza, Sankar, etc., he had had no explanation to give. Yet they are both religions of the most sublime form. The fact is that Freudianism is a science, and like other sciences, it has its own limitations. Bound up within the arena of phenomena, it cannot enter into the mysteries of the noumena or of God and religion, which are amenable only to the mystic intuition of a man, possessing a pure soul within an equally pure body.

The phenomena of religion, as discussed in Freudianism, may be reviewed from an altogether different standpoint as well. Like all other facts of the world, the fact of Freud's religion admits, from axiological point of view, of two different interpretations. The convention of marriage in a society has, indeed, a spiritual sanctity of its own, for it sustains the flow of life in tact through procreation, based more on the co-operation of two loving souls than on the union of two animal bodies. Yet, looked at from the side of the man on earth, it is no better than, what Spencer calls, legalised prostitution. Similarly, the temptation

that a child feels for the breast of his mother is certainly not what a libido-stricken or a lewd person feels for, however much Freud might have written about infantile sexuality. No body can deny the presence of erotic impulses in living creatures. One may even admit its presence in under-aged boys and girls. Yet it is not the last word in the science and art of love and sexuality. There is a stage, for example, in human life, both at the bottom and at the apex, where there is no sex-impulse to disturb the tranquillity of his soul. A boy of a year or two covets his mother for the sake of mother alone with no motive, far less sexual, behind. In old age, much of its virulence or intensity vanishes. Again if a man leads a spiritual life, no trace of this instinct is, at the end, visible in him. *Mahadeva*, the prince of the *sanyasins*, typifies such a life for all men to emulate. He withered Cupid, the god of love, into the ashes of non-entities. The conscience or, in the words of Freud, the super-ego in man is not the monitor only to send the evil propensities down to the dark chamber of the unconscious, but it is the voice of God for men always to listen to. If human beings act up to what the voice dictates, the evil urges will no longer add to the burden of the unconscious, but will eventually die out of existence altogether. The Sankhya and Yoga systems of the Hindus have prescribed some practical ways and means for the eradication of the evil propensities and the attainment of bliss.

RELIGIONS WITHOUT GOD

(A)

JAINISM

Jainism, as a faith, is ordinarily associated with the name of Mahavira, as its founder, although its origin dates far back into the pre-historic days. As many as twenty-three Tirthankaras had come and gone before the turn came for Mahavira, who was the twenty-fourth in the chain of the liberated saints. And yet he was not the last one. Enlightenment is no monopoly of a man or a race. It is an open promise for all. To the Carvaka-theory of perception as the only source of knowledge, the Jaina philosophy adds two more, viz. inference and testimony, wherewith it proves the existence of souls. Souls are as numerous in number as the material things are. Even a particle of matter, say, of dust has a soul behind. The matter, like a crust, encircling the soul has to be crushed down before a soul can shine, like the sun undisturbed by cloud, in its own effulgence. The entire philosophy or religion of Jainism is an attempt in that direction. Essentially, there is no distinction to make between one soul and the other. Potentially, they are all equal. The difference lies in the actualisation of these inherent potentialities. There is indeed a hierarchy in the scale in respect of this actualisation, with the minutest particles of dust at the basis and the Tirthankaras at the apex. Superior to all other things of the world, animate or inanimate, man is below the rank of the Tirthankaras or the liberated saints. A prisoner within the prison of the body, he lacks in perfection and is

thereby debarred from infinite bliss, which is attainable only when he is completely free from the fetters of matter that cling to or permeate the soul as effects of *karma* (deeds), born of passions and desires in man. Concomitantly with the annihilation of the desires and passions in man and consequently with the gradual cessation of *karma*, there is an automatic slackening of the hold of the matter on the soul, till at last it drops down completely, leaving the soul alone to shine in its own infinite glory and bliss. The liberated soul possesses infinite knowledge, infinite power, infinite bliss and happiness. In short, he attains all perfection. The Tirthankaras have invented some practical methods for the attainment of this goal and they are the faith in the teachings of the Jaina teachers, correct knowledge thereof, and lastly right conduct that consists chiefly in the abstinence from injury to life, from falsehood, voluptuousness etc. As for the axiological and religious end, the philosophy of Kapila is in considerable agreement with that of the Jainas.

(B)

THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY

For both of them, there is no God. For both of them, the liberation of the soul from the clutches of the clay or, in other words, realisation of the self, as it is, is the *summum bonum* of human life. Both of them are the followers of *jnana-marga* or the path of knowledge in their quest after truth. But the actual procedure, metaphysical or epistemological, adopted by the Sankhya philosophy is more elaborate than that of the Jaina philosophy. To the four elements of

matter, viz., earth, water, fire and air of the later, the former adds one more, i.e., Akasa or ether. That is not all. By a subtle process of epistemological analysis, Kapila, the founder of Sankhya philosophy has gone further deep down the elements and has discovered three *Gunas*, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* as the constituents of *Prakriti*, at the back and as the basis of the aforesaid subtle elements or, as a matter of fact, of all creations of the world. They have not to be, however, misunderstood for qualities. They are substantive elements. They are realities. There are in all two fundamental and mutually independent realities. They are *Purusa* and *Prakriti*. The former, as an embodiment of pure consciousness or as an intelligent principle, is only a *sakshi* or an inactive witness in whose presence or on account of whose proximity or *samjoga*, the latter gets agitated, loses its original equipoise and equilibrium and starts evolution of the universe from out of its own womb, as it were. The first child of *prakriti* is *Mahat*, the germ of the world. It is also called *Buddhi*. It appears as conscious because of the reflection of the consciousness of the self poured over it. Next comes *Ahankara* or the sense of I, the ego that a man possesses. From *Ahankara* with the predominance of the element of *Sattva* weighing on it, arise the five *Jnanendriyas*, five *Karmendriyas* and lastly *Manas*, which is the *Indriya* of all *indriyas* partaking of the efficacy of both the *jnana* and *karmendriyas*. As such, it is called the *Ubhayendriya*. With the excess of *Tamaguna*, the self-same *Ahankara* produces five *Tanmatras* as the potentialities of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. These elements, in due course, get crystallised into the five gross elements of ether, air, fire, water and lastly earth in the same order. Thus there are twenty-four types of exist-

tents evolved out of the *Prakriti* to which *Purusa*, although independent of *Prakriti*, may be added as one of the objects of philosophical discourse and religious contemplation. Obviously therefore, there are in all twenty-five *Tattvas* or principles to deal with in the Sankhya philosophy.

Ontologically free and immortal, the *Purusa* nevertheless suffers from the miseries of the world on account of identification, though wrongly, of the self with the non-self—the *Ahankar*, the *Buddhi*, the mind and lastly the body. The pain of the body, the sorrows in mind are felt, through *aviveka* or ignorance, as the *Purusa's* own pain and own sorrow. The essence of Sankhya philosophy lies in its insistence on the fact that with the dawn of *Viveka-jnana* or enlightenment, the darkness of ignorance will instantaneously die out or vanish. And for that *Sankhyakara* prescribes a course of training which is at once intellectual and spiritual. Mere intellectual apprehension of truth will not do, spiritual realisation based on moral discipline and contemplation is a pre-necessity for the redemption of the soul from the devouring love and the coiling embrace of the *Prakriti*. For the attainment of this state of salvation or *Mukti*, *Jivanmukti* or *Videhamukti*, one has to depend on his own endeavour alone. Self-help is the only possible help to depend on. There is no extraneous agency, say God, to come to his help. As a matter of fact, there is no God.

Whether or not the followers of the Jaina or Sankhya philosophy believe in the existence of God, the attributes that they attribute to the liberated saints and *Purusas* make each of them no less than a

god per excellence. Each of them is omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent. And hence there are, as many number of gods as there are souls. Logical necessity and religious proclivity, that led to the supersession of polytheism in favour of monotheism, are equally applicable in these cases too. There cannot but be one soul, one *Purusa*, that is, one God, the Absolute. The souls or the *Purusas* partaking of the nature of the Absolute are naturally god-like and in the extreme ontological sense indential with Him. Obviously, therefore, to know one's own self is to know God Himself. "*Atmanam Biddhi*" or "know thyself", as a spiritual precept is meaningful in this sense only. This is the ideal that the Jaina and Sankhya philosophies appear to have recommended for men to follow without much ado about gods and goddesses that, shorn of religious devotion and spiritual discipline in day-to-day conduct, are no better than empty sound and names. To a liberated soul that has realised its own self, the duality between the *Purusa* and the *Prakriti*, between the matter and the mind soon disappears. Everywhere does he find his own self or his god manifested. The *kshetra* and the *kshetrajna* are in essence identical. (See chapter XI of the Bhagavat Gita). The *Purusottama* realises. His potentialities through the *kshetra* and the *kshetrajna*.

(C)

BUDDHISM

Practical-mindedness in seeking one's own salvation out, independent of a god, is no monopoly of the Jaina and Sankhya philosophies alone. Mention may be made

also of Buddhism. Tired of the intellectual casuistries and the gymnastics of the metaphysicians, who deny one another's ontological standpoints both in respect of the processes and results, leaving the unsophisticated general mass of people in the maze of bewilderment, unable to ascertain which way to go or which one to adopt, Buddha, the embodiment of love for the living beings, chalks out a line of action, bereft of philosophical speculations, that shall lead to the cessation of all miseries, nay of the flow of life itself, for life is the seed of all miseries. The life of a man is an event like all other events of the world and is caused by certain antecedent causes. When the causes are removed by enlightenment, the life as an effect thereof fuses out of existence. The chain of birth and rebirth comes to an end. Averse to metaphysical thoughts, Gautama observes scrupulous silence on the questions of the existence and non-existence of God and soul and goes straight to what the human heart incessantly cries for, and that is the removal of sufferings and miseries, bound up with the existence of life. He discovered through enlightenment four truths (*Catvari aryasatyani*), and they are the existence of misery, the existence of the cause of misery, the possibility of the cessation of misery and lastly the existence of the path, leading to the cessation of misery. That there is misery in the world is admitted in this or that form by all thinkers. What is conspicuous in Buddhism is that it goes deeper still and identifies all existence with misery. Is non-existence of all kinds identical with the absence of all kinds of misery? Is *nirvana* equal to complete annihilation? Does absence of misery mean only a vacuum or something positive? These are the questions that naturally pose for an answer. The very existence of Buddha in flesh and blood

after he had obtained *Bodhi* and his incessant activities for the good of his fellow-beings is a definite answer to these queries. The state of *nirvana* is a positive existence which, although in itself supranatural, can yet act through nature without in any way being contaminated by her. The subsequent commentaries made by the disciples of Buddha on his philosophy, beginning with the *vijnana-vada* (Subjective idealism) of the *Yogacara* school via the *bahyanumeya-vada* of the *Sautrantika* school of thought and ending with the *bahya-pratyaksa-vada* (Realism) of the *Vaibhasika* school of thought in cancellation of the *sunyavada* (Nihilism) of the *Madhyamika* school of thought are all unquestionable pointers to this direction. The state of *nirvana*, in this sense, is identical with the state of *Jivanmukti* of the *Sankhya* school of thought. In a situation like this, the liberated is above all miseries of the world and is full of bliss. Absence of misery means the presence of bliss. Cessation of birth and rebirth signifies the extinction of the phenomenal self of a man (See *Sunyavada* of the *Madhyamika* school), the noumenal self remaining as it eternally is. (See *Vijnanavada* of *Yogacara* school). The noumenal self of Buddha like the *Purusa* of *Sankhya* logically and naturally gets merged in the *Purusottama*, the Supreme self or the Absolute of the vedantist (*Advaita*). This is the goal that Buddha wanted his disciples silently to reach through the paths, which are generally known as the eightfold noble paths consisting of eight steps, viz., right views, right determination, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right endeavour, right mindfulness and right concentration. He prescribes a way of life that is in between the two extremes, that is, of self-indulgence and self-abnegation.

Viewed from the above angle of vision, there is little difference between the philosophy of Buddha and that of Sankara. What was implicit in the former was made explicit in the latter. And it is, in this sense alone, that Sankara is often called a concealed Buddhist or a Buddhist in disguise. To us it appears that if Sankara is a concealed Buddhist, Buddha too is equally a concealed Sankarite or a Vedantist.

POSTULATES OF RELIGION

(A)

GOD—PERSONAL AND IMPERSONAL

The concept of God is the central pivot round which all religions move. A great deal of the type of religion a man professes, depends on the nature of God that he conceives of. Theistic religions believe in a personal God, who thinks, wills and loves. For the theists, there is always a relation of reciprocity between man and God, the worshipper and the worshipped, the lover and the beloved, but for which there can be no religion worth its name. Unless a man gets sure that all his reverence and love for, and all his deeds consecrated to, his God will get their due response and appreciation from Him, he is likely to have little interest in treading the path of religion, specially when, in the nature of things, it presupposes a lot of sacrifice of happiness and pleasure that the use and often misuse of the senses may bring. To love and to be loved, as between two persons and here between God and man, constitute the essence of the theistic religions. There is, of course, none to object to the belief in the personality of man, but the theory of the personality of God is objected to by many on various grounds. Self-consciousness is relative to other consciousness. There can be no consciousness of 'I' and 'Mine', unless there is a simultaneous consciousness of 'Thee' and 'Thine' or, in short, the consciousness of the existence of something other than the self. To that extent, therefore, the self is limited, for the 'something' as stated above, is independent of and beside the self. God being the

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only One, infinite, omnipotent and omniscient cannot be the one among many. Furthermore, self-consciousness is not the only criterion of personality. The element of will has a tremendous say in the matter. Personality is more dynamic than static. It admits of growth from the lower to the higher stage, in course of struggle against what is evil, and of approximation to what is good. "The civilised man is more personal than the semi-civilised, and within the same society, the man who conscientiously strives to realise what is implied in his station and its duties is more fully personal than the idle and the indifferent individual." (Galloway: *The Philosophy of Religion*, P. 493-94.) God, being the most perfect One, has no evil to encounter and no good to realise, for He is above all evil and good, one anticipating the other. As in Himself the consummation of all ideals, He has no ideal which He is in want of and which He should, therefore, follow. He is not an ethical being in the sense a man is. The Absolutists like Spinoza, Bradley, etc., in the West and like Sankara in the East, entertain this view. Minus individual differentiations, their approach to the fundamental reality is more or less identical. For them all, the Absolute is God and God is the Absolute. He is the only Reality, all other things including man are, in the ultimate analysis, so many illusory appearances. The religion for them is definable in terms of realisation, on the part of man, of his identity with his God, which means the merging of the individual self in the ocean of the Absolute, wherein it loses consequently its self-identity. "In this unity", according to Bradley, "relations of isolation and hostility are affirmed and absorbed. Error, ugliness and evil are all transmuted and absorbed in it." (Thilly: *History of Philosophy*, P. 558.) Self-annihilation and not

the two forms of the same substance. "*Tat Tvam Asi*" or "That thou art" means qualified identity between God and man. 'That' stands for God as God and 'Thou' stands for God as in the form of man. There is a relation of *bheda* and *abheda* simultaneously subsisting between the two. Stress being given on the *bheda* aspect, there is the possibility of a relation, as between man and God. Nimbarka is, more or less, a proponent of the same philosophical thought as Ramanuja. Madhva, however, has gone a step forward to hold that the self (*Jiva*) and God (*Brahman*) are the two different realities. He is a believer in *Dvaita-Vad*.

The differences of opinion with regard to the question of the relation between God and man, presupposed in all religions, are all due to the differences in the make-up of human mind with its nisus towards the realisation of the unseen and the unknown. Religion is not a static phenomenon. It is, like a living organism, ever growing in its attempts at the apprehension of the highest Truth, that is God. Each stage has its sanctity in respect of the people, whose spiritual and moral growth it represents. Idolatry is as much meaningful as Monism is, in the environmental and mental set-up in which it came into existence. No doubt, the highest kind of religion, intellectually conceivable by the human mind, is found in monism; but the most practical religion, however, that appeals both to the head and the heart of average men, lies in what we call theism. On this issue, the question put by Arjuna, the representative man, and the answer given to it by Lord Krishna, the representative God, are of immense significance.

ARJUNA UVACA

1. *Evam satatayukta ye
bhaktas tvam paryupasate
ye ca'py aksaram avyaktam
tesam ke yogavittamah.*

- (1) Those devotees who, thus ever earnest, worship thee and those again (who worship) the Imperishable and the Unmanifested, which of these have the greater knowledge of *yoga*?

(S. Radhakrishnan: The Bhagavadgita, P. 291.)

SRIBHAGAVAN UVACA

2. *Mayy avesya mano ye mam
nityayukta upasate
sraddhya parayo 'petas
te me yuktatama matah.*

- (2) The Blessed Lord said : Those who fixing their minds on Me worship Me, ever earnest and possessed of supreme faith—they do I consider most perfect in *Yoga*.

(S. Radhakrishnan : The Bhagavadgita, P. 291.)

5. *Kleso 'dhikatâras tesam
avyaktasaktacetasam
avyakta hi gatir duhkham
dehavadbhir avapyate.*

- (5) The difficulty of those whose thoughts are set on the Unmanifested is greater, for the goal of Unmanifested is hard to reach by the embodied beings.

(S. Radhakrishnan : The Bhagavadgita P. 293.)

(B)

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

If immortality of the soul is a postulate of religion, religion too, in a sense, is a postulate of the theory of immortality. If God exists and if religion in the form of a relation between God and man is a fact, then the permanence of the human soul or its survival after death is a truth that none can deny. Deny religion and deny the immortality of the soul or assert religion and assert the immortality of the soul. These are the two alternatives open to mankind for acceptance. The materialists accept the former and the idealists the latter. In spite of the differences amongst the materialists and the atheists with regard to the nature of the soul, they are, nevertheless, one in their opinion that the soul is made of dust and to dust (matter) it returns after death. It has no independent existence that survives bodily death. It is indeed a brain-function with which it rises and falls or arises and collapses. Hume and Mill defined mind as a collective name given to the bundle of impressions, received through the senses and connected together by the forces of association. Whether or not, these impressions or the mental states are bound up together by the laws of association, it goes beyond one's wit to understand how these states separately or in their combination account for the idea of the selfhood in men or for the sense of "I" that is actually understood in and, therefore, precedent to, each of these mental impressions or states which, but for it, are mere abstractions. It is indeed the one abiding and persisting agent that unifies these otherwise disconnected and hence meaningless mental states into a coherent and meaningful whole by appropriating them all as its own states of knowing, feeling and willing. It is, as

it were, the string on which each of the flowers hangs so as to constitute a garland. Cut out the string, and there is no garland of flowers. The "I" or the "Ego" indicates a reality that is above and beyond the mere sum-total of these mental states and processes, and by reference to which alone they are what they are. And it is the soul that does not die with the cessation of the above processes. Neo-realistic thinkers like Russell and others of his way of thought steer clear out of both matter and mind in the sense in which they are conventionally used, and identify mind with the cross-section of the neutral entities. They are neutral in the sense that, in themselves, they are neither mind nor matter. As a matter of fact, they are no entities at all. Viewed at the cross-section, it is mind, and the selfsame entities, looked at from a different perspective, constitute matter. In spite of the obliteration of all distinctions between mind and matter, the neo-realists are, by temperament and profession, objective in leanings. Out Herroding Herrod, as it were, they have gone a step forward in depriving mind of the subjective and epiphenomenal status, that even the traditional materialists and the atheists condescended to ascribe to it. Mind is as objective as matter and there is not the slightest tinge of subjectivity around it. Essentially the subject is equal to the object, or in other words, they are identical. Ontologically less mindful as they are, the British and the American neo-realists do not bother much about the epistemological problem of how mind, as a self-conscious agent, acts on and is reacted against by the objects. As a matter of fact, they fail to give a plausible account of mind as a self-conscious entity. The only exception is found in the philosophy of Samuel Alexander, who admits of the qualitative and not the quantitative distinction between matter and

mind. Mind is an emergent quality arising at, and certainly not caused by, a certain stage of neural complexes. This is the highest quality that has hitherto emerged out of space-time in its nisus towards the "Deity". He identifies consciousness with self-consciousness. Knowing is self-knowing. In knowing an object, the knower knows himself. Whether knowing, in all cases, anticipates self-knowing, or whether self-knowing comes next to knowing is not the problem that concerns us here and now. The point at issue is that Alexander, unlike his co-thinkers, proposes to accord a unique status to mind which, although not independent of space-time, is not, on that account, reducible to, or caused by, matter and finally by space-time. It is obviously as transitory as the epiphenomenon or the brain-product of the traditional materialists. Take away neural complexes, and finally space-time, and there is no substantive mind.

In final analysis, it becomes identical with spatio-temporal contour which, if anything, is not conscious at any rate. And as such, the arguments that are generally put forward against the materialistic interpretation of the status of mind, are equally applicable in the case of neo-realism as well. That there is matter is known in and through mind. The theory of the directness of perception or of compresence and enjoyment, as advocated by S. Alexander, cannot do away with the mental character of knowledge. It is the subject that knows the object and not vice versa. Minus mind, there is nothing that is knowable. If priority is ever to be given, it is to be given to mind which is known first and which is perhaps the only thing known, for knowledge is confined to ideas and mental representations of objects, if any, in the world outside. The theory of the conservation of energy pro-

vides no less difficulty for the materialists to account for the advent of mind out of matter. If one form of physical energy is transformable into another form of physical energy only, mind as a non-physical reality cannot be a product thereof without, at any rate, any diminution of the stock of energy that is supposed to remain constantly the same in quantity. Mind or soul (used in the same sense in western philosophy) is thus independent of matter. So the death of the body does not mean the death of the soul. Besides these logical proofs, there are certain rational-cum-sentimental grounds as well, that justify the theory of the deathlessness of the soul. Both in religion and in morality, there is one supreme Ideal to follow. This supreme Ideal does never become actual for, in that case, it loses its Ideality as also its superiority in preference to a still superior one, for the universe physical and mental, is ever on the move forward and is never at rest. For the religionists, God is the supreme Ideal. Partaking of the nature of the Absolute self, the human self, consciously or unconsciously, is ever making approach towards Him. The more he knows, the more he wants to know of Him. There is no hide and seek game, no mirage, no deception at any step. At every stage, there is the bliss and at every step ahead, there is more and more of it. God is infinite and the quest after Him is also through infinite time. In this eternal game of love between God and man, between the divine and the human spirit, as in religion, none loses its identity. God is eternal, so the human soul is. The self-surpassability of the intellectual curiosities, emotional appreciability and volitional motivity tends to support this contention, for these innate urges in man cannot all be in vain or for nothing. On a similar consideration, the pursuit of the supreme ideal

in morality anticipates the eternal existence of the soul that knows no death or decay. Kant, in his Critique of Practical Reason, employs the same argument in proving the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. The moral sense demands that virtue and happiness must go together. Very often than not, the reverse happens in the world. Honesty brings in misery and dishonesty affluence. This state of things cannot continue for ever. It must have its end, if not in this life, in the life or lives to come hereafter. As of necessity, therefore, the soul of man with his personal identity must survive physical disintegration. Similarly to associate virtue with happiness and vice with misery, there must be an unerring dispenser of justice, who is all-knowing, all-powerful and, in short, all-perfect. He is God. As the embodiment of the moral excellences that the moralists strive for, He is at once the supreme Ideal of the moralists and the God for worship and reverence of the theists. In this eternal game of morality and religion, both God and man, as partners, are eternally present.

(C)

FREEDOM OF WILL

Society, state and international ethicists enjoin some obligations on each of the citizens of the world. Obligations, on their part, call for certain rights and privileges for the citizens to enjoy. Of them the freedom of choice is the most fundamental one. Denial of this basic right virtually means the denial of responsibility on the part of the responsible. What is true of the day-to-day secular life of man is equally true of man in his dealings with his God. If he is not free to

approach his God in the manner he wants to, if his love or aversion for God is not his own doing, credit or discredit, virtue or vice cannot and should not cling to him on account of his love for or hatred against God. Yet there are some philosophical 'Isms' that appear to have lent support to the theory of grim determinism in the workings of nature including human conduct. For example, the materialists attach no sanctity to mind exercising discretion in its activities. As a by-product of matter, it is under the sway of the same law of causality that reigns supreme in the physical world. The volition in man is an effect of some antecedent events, physical or mental, working as cause in an unbroken series of causes and effects. The strongest of the volitions, when created, automatically bursts forth into the inward or outward deed of a man in which, personally, he has had no initiative to take. It occurs as a matter of course. If a man thinks that he has done a thing at his own discretion, the leaf of a tree, had it been conscious, in the opinion of Samuel Alexander, could equally feel and say that it had intentionally fallen down, while actually it was drawn to the earth by the force of gravitation. The sensationalists, like the materialists, uphold the same theory of necessitarianism both in the realm of matter and mind. By nature self-imposing, the sensationalism, as a theory, ignores subjectivity in the workings of mind. In volition, as in cognition and emotion, it is not a subject or an ego but the sequences of events in the impurposive causal nexus that work and count. Liberty is a meaningless term, for it means a break in the causal chain. Each of the volitional activities is, in that case, just a causeless new beginning, and no science, worth its name, can think of an event having no cause behind. What is mechanical determinism to

the scientists and certain sections of philosophers ascends to the status of pre-determinism in religion. To God who is omniscient, there is nothing unseen or unknown. He has fore-knowledge of all that had happened in the past, is happening in the present and shall happen in the future. So in the eye of God, every action of man is predetermined and he has had nothing to do independently and at his own initiative. Determinism or pre-determinism, man as man is, in both the cases, reduced to the status of automata with a god, if any, who only helplessly looks on and who is only a sightseer or who has pre-ordained the fate of man. In either case, consciousness or self-consciousness in man is an unkind joke, cut by God and/or by the blind forces of nature or, at any rate, it is a superfluity that ought not to have come into existence at all. But the fact of the distinction between a machine and an organism (See Caird's Philosophy of Religion, P. 99.) as also the fact of human reason, that alone is the sole judge to decide whether or not human activities are predetermined by agencies or agency other than the self, go a long way to support the contention that there is something in man, that does not admit of the mechanical interpretation, and that in all his activities, man is relatively independent of the extraneous forces or agencies. It is called 'Relatively' for self-determination does not deny the theory of causality and the possibility of the self being influenced by external forces, physical or mental. What it wants to insist is that these influences are absorbed in and by the self and the final say and initiative, in all its deeds, rests always with the self alone. The choice made in favour of one desire in preference to all others, as at the stage of the conflict of desires (Motive), the discretion exercised in the adoption of means for the realisation of the end (Intention) are the factors, indica-

tive of the freedom of man. The term 'strongest motive' is meaningless, for as a chosen desire, it is only one with none to vie with. Strong or weak, the desire, the motive and the intention are meaningful only, when related to an ego, which desires, and intends and in whose absence they are only mechanical urges, indistinguishable from one another. That which gives them sense can, by no logic, be itself made sensible by them. Further, there is no incongruity between the human personality and the divine predetermination. Human activities are set in time series. Events in the past and in the future are both absent in the present. But in the Absolute or in the eye of God, there is no past or future. Both shrink to perpetual present. In Him, there is eternal here and now and no hereafter or heretofore. In Him, there is nothing like beginning, nothing like end; everything is. The following quotations from the *Bhagavadgita* will bear ample testimony to what is stated above.*

“*ithai kutham jagat krtsnam
pasya dya sacaracaram
mama dehe gudakesa
yac ca nyad drastum icchasi*”

Here today, behold the whole universe, moving and unmoving and whatever else thou desirest to see, O Gudakesa (Arjuna), all unified in my body. (Chap XI-7).

“*tasmat tvam uttistha yaso labhasva
jitva satrun bhunksva rajyam samrddham
mayai 'vai' te nihatah purvam eva
nimittamatram bhava savyasacin*”

Therefore arise thou and gain glory. Conquering thy foes, enjoy a prosperous kingdom. By Me alone are

*The Chap. XIth, as a whole, may be read.

they slain already. Be thou merely the occasion,
O Savyasacin (Arjuna). (Chap XI—33.)

“*dronam ca bhisman ca jayadratham ca
karnam tatha nyan api yodhaviran
maya hatams tvam jahi ma vyathistha
yudhyasava jetasi rane sapatnan*”

Slay Drona, Bhishma, Jayadratha, Karna and other great warriors as well, who are already doomed by Me. Be not afraid. Fight, thou shalt conquer the enemies in battle. (Chap XI—34.)

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FOUNDATIONS FOR THE BELIEF IN THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

As in the British court of justice, where the accused is always taken to be innocent, and where it is for the prosecution to prove that he is guilty, so in matters that concern God, it is incumbent on the believers to prove that God exists to a comparatively indifferent set of people, too engrossed in things natural to deal with the supernatural. The arguments put forward for the above end are, broadly speaking, cosmological or causal, teleological, moral and lastly ontological, backed up by some subsidiary arguments, viz., argument based on universal consent, on intuition, on epistemological and finally on practical considerations. Causal argument represents the theistic interpretation of the law of causality, as offered by the scientists. To the scientists, a cause is nothing but the invariable, unconditional event happening immediately before another event that is called the effect. How the cause passes over to the effect, no science can explain. All sciences discover laws showing uniformity in the happenings of the phenomena but fail to explain that which so happens. Of the eternal queries of the human intellect, summed up in the interrogations like Why, How and What, science furnishes answer to the How only, the rest being left over to philosophy to deal with. The world is a system of causes and effects. Each of the events constituting the system is, in itself, a cause and an effect simultaneously. None is, therefore, exclusively a cause by itself. Infinite regress in quest of the causeless cause is unthinkable. The law of causality, supported by intuitive apprehension as well as the law of parsimony, demands that there

must be an uncaused first cause behind the ever shifting panorama of the world we know. This is really speaking the cause of all causes that are, in relation to it, all secondary, caused by antecedent causes and themselves causing effects following them. Human intellect can never rest in peace with these ever changing causes and effects and craves for an anchorage somewhere that knows no change and that has no beginning nor end. In short, what is contingent necessitates a necessary existence somewhere. (See Martineau). This gives a reply to Kant's objection to positing a supreme cause with a view to avoiding infinite regress. The verdict of reason as also the recent revelations of science in respect of the universe being looked upon as a unity, a single whole, in spite of the diversity it possesses, point to the fact that this cause cannot be more than one. The causal nexus, working relatively independently, in the different departments of the world, is ultimately reducible to this Supreme cause from which all secondary causes draw their origin and sustenance. The infinity of the final cause is proved not by causal argument, as supposed and then criticised by Caird, but by the sheer necessity of epistemological dialecticism. The idea of the finitude anticipates the idea of the Infinite which is, as such and, according to Descartes, prior to the idea of the finite. It is not a negative idea, as the empiricists believe, but a positive conception, in the absence of which the finite could not have been recognised as finite. There is no duality between the infinite and the finite, between the final cause and the universe as the effect thereof, for the effect is in essence the cause in a new form. It is in this sense alone that we are in agreement with Dr. Caird, when he says that the infinite does not annul the finite but embraces it. (The Philosophy of Religion, P. 144.)

By a Psychological interpretation of the theory of causality, Dr. Martineau tries to prove self-consciousness in the ultimate cause. The idea of causality involves the notion of a substance having force, efficiency, productivity, etc. As self-conscious beings, men derive these ideas from within themselves. In putting forth energy, either in thought or in deed, they feel that they are the causes producing the effects. This Dr. Martineau transfers, by analogy, to the external nature and believes that there is equally a self-conscious mind regulating and directing the events of the world to a definite end. The teleological argument adds further to the strength of the above proof and that in a more convincing manner. The evidence of design or, in the words of Martineau, of selection, combination and gradation in the workings of nature, furnishes proofs for the existence of a rational Mind, controlling events of the world. That this Mind is not an efficient cause only dealing with self-existent materials is proved by the law of causality, as stated above. In fact, He is both the efficient and the material cause of the world of matter and mind, both being either His creations (theistic interpretation) or His self-expressions and manifestations (Philosophical interpretation). The evils of the world, that appear to have detracted considerably from the importance of the argument from design are, in some cases, a necessity, and in all cases more apparent than real. The labour pain of the mother heralds the pleasure of the birth of a child. The incessant hard labour, physical or mental, of an investigator in the realm of science or of a devotee in search of his God, ushers in more and more of the light of knowledge in the case of the scientist, and of more and more of the faith and bliss in the case of the devotee. But for the presence of this travail, much of the flavour of the pleas-

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able feeling of a mother or of the bliss of a believer would have been lost in vain, for feelings, pleasurable or painful, shine by contrast. Reversal of the process, say, the miscarriage in the case of the mother or ill success in the case of the scientist and the spiritualist, furnishes instances explainable in terms of the law of *karma*. Impediments, met with in one's life's journey, are the fruits of his past deeds, done in this or previous life or lives. Counteraction in the present life may counteract the results of the past deeds. Thus in spite of fetters, the man is essentially free. Natural and national calamities too, are no exception to the law of *karma*. Furthermore, many of the evils and what we call good are the creation of the society and the state, changeable, in status, from society to society, and state to state. What is sometimes good in the one is bad in the other and vice versa. Again in a particular society, what is good in one set of circumstances is bad in another set. In themselves, therefore, they appear to have no colour at all. They are colourless. In pursuance of this line of thought, this is not probably unreasonable to think that there is in God nothing like what we call good and bad, virtue and vice, light and shade. They have relevancy only in the world of the phenomena and the finites. From what is stated above, it transpires finally that the Infinite cause, as established by the law of causality, backed up by epistemological considerations is, as per findings of the teleological argument, the Supreme Mind, full of knowledge and power. The theoretical arguments, hitherto followed, in justification of the existence of God, are further supported by practical considerations, as are evident in moral arguments, put forward, for example, by Kant and Martineau. (See Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Martineau's Ty-

pes of Ethical Theory and Study of Religion, Vol. II) Kant argues that the practical and the moral sense demands perfect coincidence between virtue and happiness, vice and pain which, unfortunately, is not very often the case in the world, we live in. Hence there is the necessity of postulating a supreme moral governor who, because of omniscience and omnipotence, is indeed God Himself. He associates finally virtue with happiness and vice with pain in the future life or lives of men, if not in the present life. Martineau reaches the same conclusion by a Psychological analysis of the sense of obligation and responsibility in all men. It involves two personalities. One is responsible for fulfilling certain obligation to the other. The former, in all cases, is a man but the latter, although apparently a man or men taken collectively is, in the ultimate analysis, nothing short of God. One owes certain duties to his wife and to his child, not for the sake of the wife or the child as such, but for the sake of the spirit within them. Had the target been the man alone and nothing beyond him or her, the majority of the human beings would have felt tempted to evade their duties unto him or her. The transcendence of the target of obligations, at the human level of existence, is a fact that cannot be denied. It points to God, who is the Supreme personality and to whom all moral obligations of men and women are ultimately due. The theoretical justification and pragmatic obligation, in respect of the existence of God, are further accentuated by the intuitive apprehension and the common consensus of opinion of man, that furnish, in short, the essence of the ontological arguments sponsored by eminent thinkers like Anselm, Descartes, Flint, etc. It consists in proving from the idea of God in human minds the ontological existence of God on the plea, that the idea of God is such as proves automa-

tically its objective validity, that is, its existence. Anselm argues that there is in human mind the idea of an infinite, absolute and all-perfect being, that is, God. He must exist, for existence is an essential element of perfection. Minus existence, perfection is no perfection. Descartes subscribes to this view with the addition that, considered from the standpoint of causality, the intuitive idea of all-perfection must have a cause behind. The world, being finite and imperfect, cannot be the cause thereof. There must, therefore, be an infinite and all-perfect being who is the inspirer of this idea in men. He is God. Dr. Flint comes to the same conclusion from another angle of vision. The ideas of infinity, perfection, etc., which each man is intuitively conscious of, are not predicable to anything of the world that is finite and imperfect. They must, therefore, be predicated of a being, already proved by causal, teleological and moral arguments, to be the possessor of all-perfection, and He is God. Dr. Martineau avows that there is in the mind of man an Ideal of perfection, which remains ever unrealisable in the human level of existence. It must be realised in a being, and He is God. Kant, however, refutes the ontological argument on the plea that the mere idea does not warrant the existence of a thing. I may have an idea of a cup of tea on my table, but that does not mean that the cup actually exists on the table. Apparently, Kant forgets that there is a difference between "The one idea" and "an idea". What comes as of necessity from within one's own self, cannot be treated as identical with an ordinary idea, irresponsibly made by a man at his sweet will. The idea of God is too innate in man to be easily brushed aside. Even the denial of God presupposes the pre-existence of God as an idea in the mind of the man who denies Him. This is a universal belief, based on univer-

sal consent. That there is no duality between the idea and the fact, or that the mind and the matter are at bottom identical is hinted at by the idealistic thinkers in general and Hegel and Caird in particular, while dealing with the science of religion.

RELATION OF GOD TO MAN AND THE WORLD

Religion indicates an approach of man to God and God to man. It is a mutual necessity. Like a father without a child, God without man is a God for none. Similarly, man without God, in the opinion of the theists, lacks in existence. The approach of one man to his God differs from that of another, because of the inherently different nature, that marks one man off from the rest. As a matter of fact, religion is a private affair for each man to deal with. The God of one is not exactly the same God of the other, for the fruition of divinity in a man depends on his capability, that differs from man to man. Creedal faith is a man-made contrivance based on common factors, discernible in the religious experiences of the saints with, more or less, common spiritual leanings. Persons professing a particular creed form a brotherhood for common good from a common platform. What is true in the sphere of faiths is equally true in the sphere of the formulations of philosophical isms in respect of the relation of God to man and the world. The theories of Dethéism, Dualistic theism, Deism, Theism and lastly Pantheism reflect human comprehensibility of the nature of God vis-a-vis that of man and the universe. At the preliminary stage of philosophic understandability, the vision of the co-presence of both the evil and the good, the holy and the unholy, leads to the belief in the existence of two gods, — one representing what is good and the other the evil. The clash between the two gods accounts for the absence of unmixed pleasure and

pain in the world. Incessant war, simultaneous presence of two monarchs holding sway over the same kingdom, are ideas revolting to commonsense. One of the two gods preferably the evil one, dies out to get resuscitated again in what we call Dualistic theism in the shape of unconscious matter. There remains still two independent realities — the personal God and the inert matter. The obduracy of the intractable matter always resists God in His attempt to give to the world just the shape He wants to. Though the evil god is gone, the trouble still persists, because of the persistent opposition of matter to all His activities. In Deism, matter too, as a reality, goes out of existence, leaving God alone as the only reality with no second beyond or beside Him. He is the personal God possessed of all the attributes (Infinitude, omnipotence, omniscience, etc.) which Dualism or Dualistic theism as a theory, more mythological than philosophical, more anthropomorphic than scientific, deprives Him of. They are further guilty of going counter to the findings of science that deciphers unity in the diversities of the universe. Thus in Deism, Monism appears to have replaced Dualism. But traditionalism is too sticky to be so easily effaced out of existence. Although deprived of its existence, the world of matter again appears as a creation of God at a particular instant of time at His own free will. It is invested with all the forces and facilities necessary for its historic growth thenceforward, independent of any extrinsic or external agencies, including God Himself. Like an artificer in relation to his machine, God is outside the world and shall interfere only, when there is a need for it. (See Bhagavat Gita, Chap. IV, Sloka 7.) Dualism creeps in again in the name of Deism and under the garb of

monism. It poses certain questions demanding answers. Why did He choose one particular instant of time and a certain collocation of points of space for His creation in preference to other instants of time and points of space? Did He create space and time along with matter and mind? Are they co-present with Him? Having nothing to do in the acosmic state, was He practically inactive? (See Martineau : Hand Book. P. 108.) These are, among others, a few of the questions which dualism and here, in this case, Deism fail to give any answer to. The most vexed and poignant situation arises, however, on the question of the irreconcilability of the spiritual aspirations of men with the total transcendence of God from the world. To a mind saturated with religiosity, the nearest and the dearest of all is his God. To think of Him as staying somewhere away from him and from the world in which he lives and which, because it has a beginning, must have its end, with all its belongings of which man is one, is simply revolting to the theistic sentiments and reason. Theism, as a theory, offers answer to these queries, and at the same time, satisfies the demands both of the head and the heart of man. In relation to the world, God is both immanent and transcendent and to man, He is the essence descended into the body of man, possessing personality. As partaking of the nature of God, man is one with and eternally related to God and as a personal being he is, at the same time, independent of Him. By way of emphasising the independent character of man, Martineau goes so far as to say that God is immanent in the world of matter and life only, and not in that of mind of man in relation to whom God is transcendent; but nevertheless, as the first cause of which man is the second one (in relation to the world), God is, in essence one

with man. This unity in diversity, the oneness in the many forms, as it were, the quintessence of the religious experiences of the saints all the world over. As in the ordinary day-to-day life of man, so in the life of spiritualism, duality is a pre-necessity for a man to love and to be loved by, else love as a human sentiment loses all its meanings. This duality does not mean absolute separation of one from the other, for no two alien realities can ever act on each other and far less understand and love each other. (See Ramanuja & Hegel.) Theism has its basis on monism which, as the seed, sprouts out into a tree with, beside others, two relatively independent branches, one being called the man and the other God. In essence, the tree is one. Similarly, in the Absolute or the Brahman, there is no duality, no God, no man. The Absolute is timeless, spaceless and admits of no differentiation or relation. Religion has its existence only in the phenomenal level of man. Once he gets over it, he loses his identity in, and with him the world of phenomena too vanishes into, the ocean of the Absolute. (See Bradley and Sankara). Curiously enough, too much of religion thereby ends in non-religion, too much of struggle for the attainment of moral excellences or too much of the quickenings of the intellect in search of truths ends in complete cessation thereof. This is a situation that no philosophy can comprehend, but can only guess. In fact, all philosophy virtually ends here and mysticism begins. If this is pantheism, this is all that philosophy can finally say about the world, the man and God. This is indeed the highest kind of philosophy that the human intellect can possibly produce.

But it is no denial of panentheism. Looked at

from the side of the universe, panentheism is all right, but from the standpoint of the Absolute, pantheism is the last word, where all this ends in that—the phenomenon in the noumenon, the matter in spirit, the individual in the universal and lastly the personal God in the impersonal Absolute.

SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

How, why and what are the eternal queries of the human heart. Science, Philosophy and Religion are but different attempts to give, in their own way, different answers to these queries. They are mutually related, and none can for itself claim to be the source of the rest. (See Galloway: History of Religion, p. 188.) Similarly, none can vouch for if any of them precedes the others, or if they have got a simultaneous start in the human mind since the inception of consciousness, getting strong enough to react against the facts of experience, that demand elucidation and clarification. But from the standpoint of growth and development, they nevertheless admit of hierarchy of less and more perfection. Science emanates from the practical and purposive impulse in man. In the words of Galloway, "Science grew out of manual arts". (Ibid. p. 189.) Economy of time and labour is the guiding principle that accentuates scientific investigation. Beginning from the adjustment of means to ends in every day business of life right upto the discovery of natural laws, summing up the ways in which they work, the same urge for economy is in evidence. Essentially practical, science searches for truths that the practical and hence the phenomenal life of man is in need of. The world is too big for a single man, however capable, to know everything of. The world is thus, for the convenience of study, divided into different departments, say for example, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Psychology, etc., each being investigated into by a band of experts in the line. The truths that they arrive at naturally differ

departmentwise and the world thus falls into pieces, which evidently it is not. The business of philosophy is to unify the apparently disconnected and often discordant truths, discovered by sciences, into a coherent system so as to give a consistent world view. "Philosophy is the universal science which has to unite the cognitions attained by the particular sciences into a consistent system". To the extent philosophy deals with the results of scientific researches, it depends on science. Equally does science depend on philosophy in respect of the postulates, say, of time, space, causality, uniformity of nature, etc., whose authenticity science accepts without questioning and without which no science can proceed. In unifying the truths of sciences, philosophy does not only add one truth to the other but also reorients them, gives them new meaning with reference to the noumenon, whose phenomenal expressions, physical or mental, the objects of scientific studies are. The external and the mechanical relation gives way to the internal and organic cohesion. "Philosophy is simply the continually repeated attempt to arrive at a comprehensive and systematic knowledge of the form and connection, the meaning and import of all things". (Paulson: Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 2 & 3.) The relation between the two, therefore, is one of mutual help and co-operation. Phenomena are the phenomena of something and that something too is knowable only through its appearances, that is, phenomena. None can deny the other. One only errs when it trespasses into the domain of the other. Self-insufficiency is one of the distinctive characteristics of science. The states of consciousness or the qualities of the physical objects (Primary & Secondary) are not self-sufficient. Their ever-changing nature points

to the direction of a changeless reality or realities behind, which philosophy, in the role of metaphysics, wants to discover. Naturally, they differ in respect of the method they employ. Science takes to the method of analysis, based on observation and experiment. It transmutes the data of experience into something other than what they are. It deals with what Hegel calls, "Things in their otherness". Water is not water but H_2O . In fact, science, with a view to reducing the differences of things to the level of their kind, stands on this differentiation. Philosophy or metaphysics deals with the inclusive whole, in which nothing is left out. Phenomenon is as much important as the noumenon is. It deals with the actual world as actual and not with the world as analysed. Reality is given and not discovered by analysis. It cannot transmute its data into terms of something other than what they are, for the business of philosophy is to disclose what these data actually are in relation to the essence that transcends the sensed.

Science, philosophy and religion follow a process of continuity. Where science ends, philosophy begins. Likewise, religion is but a logical sequence to, and a step ahead, of philosophy. Philosophy at best can furnish a rational view of the universe both in essence and appearance. The knowledge it yields is after all theoretical and, as such, superficial. It can only assert that the reality exists, but cannot say what it looks like. In short, it cannot, in the words of Mahatma Gandhi, see truth eye to eye. And for that philosophy necessarily ends in and relies upon religion. The synthetic apprehension of philosophy is toned up to the highest pitch of intuition in religion. It is no

denial but affirmation of reason at its highest perfection. In intuitive apprehension, the seeker of truth feels his identity with the reality, which he seeks and whose other name, in religion, is God. Here the knower and the known, the devotee and the Divine, the man and his God become more or less one. The subject-object relation in a knowledge-situation is completely obliterated. The Absolute Monism (*Advaita-Vada*) of Sankara in the East and that of Spinoza in the West are but different attempts at the philosophical justification of the theory of ultimate reality that admits of no differentiation, no duality. Brahman of Sankara and the Substance of Spinoza are equally colourless. Man cannot reach this height all at once. Cosmocentric as he is by aptitude, he is at the start a scientist and an atheist. For him, the world alone exists. When conscious, however, of the insufficiency of the world of matter, he seeks and finds the ultimate truth in God whom he reckons as the creator and the sustainer of the world. For him both God and the world with all its belongings including man are true. He is a philosopher. When he approaches his *Bhagavan*, through love (emotion), through *Jnan* (cognition), and *karma* (volition), he becomes, a theist or a man of religion. As a lover, he cannot long brook the retention of his self-identity, separable from the beloved, in whom he eventually merges himself. The world of phenomena vanishes and in its place only his beloved exists. (See S. C. Chatterjee & D. M. Dutt: "Introduction of Indian Philosophy,"—147 & 148). Religion ends finally in non-religion. It is a situation which no word can describe and no mind can pry into. It is only open to the mystic vision of the mystic.

IS PESSIMISM AS A THEORY OF LIFE TENABLE ?*

The answer is both affirmative and negative at the same time, for it bespeaks of the temperamental difference, discernible between man and man. Living within the otherwise self-same environmental circumstances, two human beings, very often than not, differ considerably in respect of their views of the world around them. To one, it may be full of light and hope and to the other, it is all darkness, saturated with misery and pain. It is a matter of common experience that sometimes the same event speaks differently in different minds. Death on the gallows is a covetable experience for a man, thirsting for the emancipation of his country and a terror to a man, dying the death of an ordinary criminal. It has, therefore, a tinge of individualism all around. To raise it to the status of a philosophical "Ism" what is necessary is the de-individualisation of this tendency in preference to what we call a universal outlook substantiated by the events of the world outside. It is no longer a fancy of the mind, but a fact demanding immediate acceptance. Such a theory was put forward by Schopenhauer and his follower, Von Hartmann. Schopenhauer wants his readers to believe that his philosophy of pessimism is a fairly objective and balanced view of human lives and experiences, divested of strictly personal feelings and sentiments. The ever unknown and unknowable thing-

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in-itself of Kant is, for Schopenhauer, his disciple, Will, blind, formidable and ever-striving. "It is the primary, timeless, spaceless uncaused activity, that expresses itself in 'men' as impulse, instinct, striving, craving, yearning" for something which it does 'never get. (Thilly : History of Philosophy, p. 486.) Beginning from things, lifeless and unconscious, right upto conscious human beings, there are indications of this blind Force or Will, incessantly moving forward to destinations that it shall never reach, and that shall ever recede backward, as it advances. All endeavours, on the side of man, are doomed to failure. All his life's battles are fought in vain. Insatiability is written large on the forehead of man. There is nothing like optimism of hope anywhere in life. All that a man visualises is an ocean of the pessimism of despair. Recently, there has arisen in the west a class of thinkers—litterateur-cum-philosophers—who have formulated a philosophical theory, the general tendency of which is one of pessimism and despair. It is known as Existentialism. In the later part of the 19th century, when it came, in a recognisable form, into existence, political settings, philosophical isms and ecclesiastical dispensations—all pointed to a type of world-order where collectivism got the better of individualism. Bolshevism and Fascism apart, where individuals are all but fodders for the state to consume, the much-vaunted democracy, in its ultimate analysis, does not fare much better in its attitude towards the individuals. The state is an organism of which individuals are all limbs. Self-sufficiency, if not self-identity, is denied. In Idealism a human being is relegated to the position of an unreal appearance. So is he at the hands of the materialists, who reduce him to the product of the natural forces. Dust is he and to

dust he returns at the end. The entire drama of life is determined by the grim and blind laws of nature. Man has no freedom. In religion, there is a call for the sacrifice of the one for the many, love for others in preference to the love for the self. Nowhere, therefore, does man get his due recognition. Time is a postulate for these thinkers. For Heidegger, for example, all existence is permeated through and through with temporality, which means a flux. With the Buddhists, he seems to believe in becoming as opposed to being. All existence is essentially a continuity, a change. It comes out of a mysterious nothingness to end equally in another obscure nothingness, better known as death. Although out and out a pessimist in attitude, an existentialist, unlike Schopenhauer and Buddha and like Hartmann, does not believe in the negation of the self as a remedy to the miseries in life. To enjoy life to the full and to avoid practising asceticism is the maxim that he preaches to the world.

This trend of thought in the west agrees to a great extent with the philosophy of Buddha in the East, in respect of the pessimistic attitude, that they both bear unto human life. To a Buddhist, life is misery. Avoidance of misery, therefore, depends on the annihilation of life, that persists through birth and rebirth. Birth takes place on account of *Tanha* or *Trisna* for the objects of the world, that the senses may enjoy. The *Trisna* is finally traceable to ignorance, that puts up a show of reality for what is unreal, beauty for what is not beautiful, permanence for what is impermanent and lastly truth for what is untrue. For the light of wisdom to shine and the darkness of ignorance to disappear, Buddha prescribes some ways, generally known as the Eightfold

Noble Path, for human beings, hungering for emancipation, to take to. It is in fact a code of correct thinking and right conduct. Metaphysical and religious problems have been scrupulously left out of consideration, for they cannot help men out of the miseries of life. Emancipation or *Nirvana*, as the Buddhists call it, has been interpreted differently by different thinkers. That it is a state, where there is no misery, no pain is, at any rate, universally admitted by all. Not to speak of Buddhism alone, almost all philosophies of India have been criticised by the western thinkers as essentially pessimistic in leanings, exercising thereby a very disheartening influence on the day-to-day practical life of the Indians. To them life is but a walking shadow and the world is only an empty dream; and the sooner a man passes away, the better for him.

Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
And then is heard no more: it is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury
Signifying nothing. (*Macbeth*).

But is this charge tenable? Any kind of movement, either in body or in mind, must, as of psychological necessity, issue out of a feeling of disquietude or of want. Philosophy dealing with the highest reality and itself being a product of the highest kind of speculative thought human beings are capable of, warrants and anticipates an equally powerful urge, provoking discussion on the fundamentals of life in philosophy and religion. And verily religions, all the world over, insist on redemption from the life as people live it on earth. Desire, as it is, is not bad. It all depends

on what is desired. Fight for a right cause, although unsuccessful, has a sweet fragrance of its own. Further, a life with all its hopes fulfilled and no ideal to follow, is too insipid and dull to deserve continuity. So for Buddhism and, as a matter of fact, for all Indian thoughts "pessimism is only initial and not final". Here Buddhism considerably differs from its counterparts in the west. In the philosophy of Schopenhauer as also in Existentialism, pessimism is both at the beginning and at the end. It is the Alpha and the Omega both. But in Buddhism, it is only the Alpha; the Omega is full of light and hope.

The fact is that the world is a mixture or commingling of light and shade, pleasure and pain, good and evil. It is difficult to ascertain which, on the weighing balance, out-weighs the other. All attempts hitherto made "to justify pessimism (or optimism) by drawing up a calculus of pleasures and pains and by showing that on the balance the pains are far in excess of the pleasures (or vice versa)" did not meet with success. "The difficulties in the way of framing such a calculus are insuperable—for there is no common measure in pleasures by which to evaluate them", and also for the fact that "the pleasures are notoriously different in quality". (See Galloway: *The Philosophy of Religion*, P. 545.)

Whether or not there is the preponderance of one over the other, all that human souls look for is the cessation or extinction of evil and the acquisition of what is good. Empirical sciences which show that the world is on progress but which, for that, cannot efface evils out of existence, are of little help in this direc-

tion. And it is in religion alone that people come across the message of hope and deliverance, meant for the suffering humanity. The faith in God is indissolubly linked up with the hope of redemption. The redemption from sin and miseries forms the essence of Christianity as a religion. So is the "*Ananda*" of the Hindu religion which is at the same time both "*Sat* and *Chit*" indicative of supreme bliss in the supreme reality; which is all perfect, for reality and perfection always go together. Mohammad says, "Those who abstain from vanities and indulgence of their passions, give alms, offer prayers, and tend well their trust and their covenants, these shall be the heirs of eternal happiness." Behind the ever-shifting panorama of good and evil, pleasure and pain, in the world of the senses, there is an ever-existing and eternal Reality, full of bliss and happiness that it guarantees to all, who prayerfully and sincerely seek for it. Knock, knock and knock and the doors of hope and bliss will be opened unto you.

IS EVIL COMPATIBLE WITH GOOD GOD ?

This was no problem with the primitive people. They were too innocent to indulge in any kind of intellectual curiosity. Scientific investigation, philosophical speculation were too heavy for them to bear. The question of disparity as between the good God and the existence of evil did never occur to them. Facts were taken at their face value and there was a naive and dogmatic belief in the existence of an all-powerful God, whose assistance they sought for the avoidance of the evil and the attainment of the good. The desire for an attempt to fit one with the other is of later origin, when the simple and dogmatic faith of the heart yields to the critical demands of the head. With the atheists, materialists and the agnostics, the problem is of little significance. The first two disbelieve in the existence of God, and the third takes up an attitude of doubt about His existence. But to the theists, bound up as they are by the postulates of religion, the existence of evil is a challenge, that they cannot allow to go unheeded and unanswered. The answers, as given, are many and of various kinds. The dualists like Plato and the gnostics believe in the existence of two independent realities, hostile to each other. The evil is the result of this hostility. The principle of reason or God of the platonists can hardly cope with the principle of matter, that is eternally co-present with Him. The obduracy of matter refuses to yield to the beautiful shape that God wants to give to it. The gnostics draw a sharp line of distinction between the good God and the evil God, between God and the Satan. Left to the

former alone, the world would have become heaven-like, full of happiness and bliss. Unfortunately, much of His good enterprises end, in failure on account of the Machiavellian design of the latter. The world, therefore, is a mixture of both good and evil, light and shade: There is nothing like unalloyed good and unalloyed evil. The dualists thus, it appears, saves the goodness of God, or in other words, justifies the existence of evil, at the cost of the omnipotence and infinitude of God. A God without the aforesaid attributes, if anything, is not at any rate the God of the theists. So a rational reconciliation between God as the most perfect being and the existence of evil is naturally sought for. Evil is no opponent of God, nor an independent existent apart from God. It has its necessity in the heart of the reality. Good is good just because there is evil. But for it, the good loses all its meaning and flavour. Besides, it serves as an incentive or a stepping-stone for a man to go from the lower to the higher perfections of life. Like a piece of hard iron rod, the human soul needs passing through a process of painful burning, before it gets pure and malleable enough to assume the shape it wants to. The labour pain of a girl heralds simultaneously the birth of a child and her motherhood. But for the sense of contrast with the vicissitudes of life, the feeling of joy would not have been felt like what it is at all. The beauty is beauty because of the existence of ugliness in the world. These are but two sides of the same coin, none of which can possibly be detached from the other. However undesirable, the evil has its painful utility in the world at large. It so happens very often that the more a man suffers in this world of strife and stress, the more he becomes conscious of the goodness and glory of his Father in heaven, who would, he believes, eventually

save his soul from ruin. The lives of the God-intoxicated souls, all the world over, bear ample testimony to the aforesaid fact. The pain that Christ suffered on the Cross strengthened, all the more, the belief in the love and mercy of his heavenly father, and the ultimate victory of the good over the evil. The world is a battlefield, a *Kyruksetra*, where man must have to fight his salvation out. "Life is a place of torment, where the human spirit writhes to possess the eternal." (S. Radhakrishnan : Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, P. 244.) The consciousness of sin thrives on the belief in a good God; and it rises and falls concomitantly with the rise and fall of spiritualism in a man. In a child, there is no awareness of sin, for there is no consciousness of God in him. Bradley describes sin as a discord in the otherwise ever-prevalent harmony in the Absolute or the ultimate reality, and it disappears soon after the harmony is made, from the human point of view, wide enough to engulf the so-called phenomenal discord, observable in it. Furthermore, any kind of progress in the world of phenomena presupposes always a conflict between the two antitheses, viz., good and evil, tending towards a higher synthesis, a higher level of existence. In the reality of course, there is no strife, no conflict, for there is no duality. Theists there are, however, who ignore the existence of evil as a positive reality. The evil is more a phantom than a fact, depending for its existence on the limited vision of man. Disease as the negation of health is no curse but a blessing in disguise, for it purges the poison out of the body, that is diseased. Death is a boon to the man who feels the burden of life too heavy for him to bear, and when he, in the words of a poet, cries out saying, "*Marana re tuhu mama shyama saman.*" Dr. Martineau describes evil as a creation of man himself.

God created man after His own image and endowed him with freedom of action and thought. He misuses this freedom. The result is that there is sin, bringing in its train baskets, full of misery and pain, for the sinner to suffer from. Dr. Martineau further opines that if a money-lender is not responsible for the misuse of the money he lends, God is not equally responsible for whatever use or misuse man may make of the freedom given him. As he sows, so he reaps. It savours of the traditional *Karmavad* of the Hindu philosophy. *Adrista* of a man is the stock of merits and demerits, accruing from his good and bad actions. He determines his own lot by his own deeds and misdeeds done in this or previous life or lives, and enjoys or suffers accordingly. He passes through the cycle of birth and rebirth on account of his own *Adrista*. (See Dutta & Chatterji : Introduction to Indian Philosophy, pp. 244, 245.) As a cyclic process, it knows no definite space or time to start from, for God in whom all cycles rest is not in time and space, rather time and space are in Him. "Rotation in the circle of existence is inevitable so long as (man) is blind to the Truth," which when once attained, will absolve him of all the fruits of his *karma* and eventually bring him liberation on the cessation of future births and rebirths. (See S. Radhakrishnan : Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, P. 550). Of the four noble truths of Buddha, who himself is scrupulously silent about the existence or non-existence of God, the first is the existence of misery in the world which, in its turn, issues out of *Tanha* or desire in man. Desire bursts forth into action, physical and mental. Whether or not God exists, He is in no way responsible for the evils of the world. Evils, both physical and moral, are explainable in terms of this *Trisna* taking shape in the deeds and misdeeds of

man. Calamities like the volcanic eruption, earthquake, etc., are the cumulative effects of the cumulative misdeeds of men on earth. Nowhere does God stand responsible for what happens as consequences thereof. There is yet another class of thinkers in the East as well as in the West, who deny the very existence of evil. They are Absolutists and in their Absolute "error, ugliness and evil are all transmuted and finally absorbed" (Thilly : History of Philosophy, P. 558.) Evils are but illusions, shadows in a dream, which must vanish when the man, who dreams, wakes up from the sleep of ignorance. To the pantheists like Sankara, Spinoza etc., the world with all its good and evil is but a phantasmagoria, a grand magic-show having no substantiality of its own apart from and independent of the Absolute, wherein again, looked at from the standpoint of the universal as against the particulars of the intellect, the manifold or the plurality of the world has had no existence for in the unity of the Supreme, there is no duality. The *Maya* or *Avidya* of Sankara is in the Brahman and yet out of touch with it. This indicates a truth which no intellect can peep into and which opens its secrets to the intuition of a pious soul, full of reverence and love for God and the Absolute.

IS GOD KNOWABLE?*

The problem is epistemological, seeking its solution both in metaphysics and religion. A seeker of truth in either of these spheres faces this question just at the outset. The answer is both negative and affirmative. The empiricists like Hume, Mill, Bain and the agnostics like Spencer in the West and Carvak with his followers in the East—all deny the possibility of knowing the ultimate reality which, in religion, is called God. If the senses are the only sources of knowledge, if mind, as Hume says, is merely a name given to the sum-total of the sense-impressions, or if it is only a *Tabula-rasa*, as is supposed by Locke, all attempts to know reality are bound to meet with failure, for after all, it is a transcendental existent and senses point to what is only phenomenal. Modern science has added one more fuel to it. The theory of the relativity of knowledge imposing, as it does, condition on God as an object of knowledge, precludes the possibility of His being known as He is apart from all conditions. To know God as conditioned is equivalent to not knowing Him as He is in Himself. God is, therefore, unknowable. To these arguments, the believers of God have got their counter-arguments, the best and they are as follows. The theory of Scepticism, sponsored by the empirical thinkers, is in itself self-suicidal. To say that the knowledge of the reality is not possible is itself a knowledge. Besides, it is to some extent an affirmation of some sort of knowledge of the reality, which it proposes to deny. It is known at least that it is unknowable. In any case, it is, it exists. Empiricism, objectively and subjectively considered, lacks in self-

sufficiency. It always points to something beyond. Objectively it ends in phenomenology. Phenomenon, as appearance, must have a noumenon whose appearance it is. Else the term phenomenon is meaningless. Empiricists, when they say that they know only the phenomenon, indirectly affirms the existence of the noumenon and thus far, however vaguely, they know it. Subjectively likewise, the sensations, of themselves, cannot create a world of order and harmony, for, by nature, they are detached one from the other. Smell has nothing in common with sound nor has colour any relation with taste or touch. To fuse them into a coherent and understandable world of experience, something other than sensation is necessary. In a knowledge-situation a priori elements are as much necessary as the a posteriori elements are. Kant in his critical philosophy lends support to these a priori elements. Knowledge is a product of subject-object relation. The senses furnish the materials. The reason, by the application of the fundamental notions of thought, otherwise called categories, viz., space, time, substance, causality etc., gives them a shape or a form of knowledge. It is a kind of knowledge, no doubt, but is the knowledge of the phenomena plus the categories. Nowhere is the noumenon or the thing-in-itself is traceable, which remains still a far cry. The categories are forms and not realities. They come from within. Strictly speaking, Kant knows nothing of the agency who or which supplies them. For the sake of convenience, we call it Reason. For him, the noumenal reality, within or without, remains ever unknown and unknowable. The thing is that he failed to get over the shock of Humean scepticism. And as such, he is looked upon by many as a semi-sceptic or a semi-agnostic. There is in his philosophy a distinctive opposition

between thought and reality. Reality cannot be thought of and hence known. The post-Kantian philosophers like Fichte, Schelling and lastly and mainly Hegel, abolish this opposition. Thought and Reality are, at bottom identical. The ultimate reality is Thought, the Idea ever realising itself in and through the world of matter, life and mind, which are again its material, vital and mental expressions. It is only in, and as, the self of man that the Idea looks back to its own creation and becomes conscious of them and in contrast thereto becomes, at the same time, conscious of its own self.

*Simar maje asim tumi bajao apan sur
Amar madhye tomar prakash tai ato madhur.*

This disposes of the trouble that arises out of the subject-object relation (Relativity) in a knowledge-situation. When the knower and the known are essentially one, any condition ever imposed by the subject on the object or by the object on the subject, is just the imposition of condition by the self on the self. The barrier between the two vanishes. Man is at once both human and divine in his own self.

And as like can know like, man can know God. Once he realises his God in him, he finds and feels His presence both in the field of phenomena and noumena alike. The wall between the two drops down.

*Eko deva sarbabhuteshu gurha
Sarbabyapi sarbabhutan taratma
Karmadhyaksha sarbabhutadhivasa*

There is One God who is significantly and potentially present in each of the things of the world, and who is omnipresent and the soul of everything. He is the

agent of all *karmas* (deeds) and resides in everything (man and other objects of the world).

To know that God is knowable is one thing and to realise Him actually in life is quite a different one. For that practical efforts are necessary. Faith in the words of the seers, as depicted in scriptures, is the passport for entry into the world of the spirit. It is no slavish attachment to dogma but a psychical state chastened by wisdom and enlightenment. Lucky is he who has got a chance of listening to the instructions of a living saint and acting upto them. Knowledge of principles alone will not do. You have to work them out in life. Actual deed is a necessity. Knowledge of the art and science of swimming will not do. To become a swimmer, you have to get down into water and learn swimming through repeated failures.

PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION

The relation between the two is one of the originator and the originated, the producer and the product. Religion, crude or refined, is always a mental tendency or a disposition. As for the commencement of this tendency, different opinions are held by different thinkers individually or groupwise. To some, it owes its origin to instinct. Men have got an inborn religious instinct goading them on to the path of spiritualism. Instinct, by nature automatic and spontaneous, deprives religion, to that extent, of the efficacy of speculation (thought), emotion and conation in the quest of God. And a thoughtless and emotion-cum-volitionless religion lapses into a sort of mechanical and lifeless relationship between man and his God which, if anything, is not religion at any rate. The Faculty theory in respect of the origin of religious sentiments yields no better result. It makes only an element of the human mind answerable to the call of the divine while, in fact, the whole of it is involved in the study of the whole of the reality, what is God. In the words of Dr. Galloway, "The soul is certainly not divisible into compartments, and while mental aspects are distinguishable in thought, they are not divided in the nature of things. In every psychical process all the elements are involved." (Philosophy of Religion, P. 74.) What is true of the process in its relation to the things of the world is more so, when directed to God. In the relation of man with his God, there remains nothing in him that is not God-intoxicated. The theory of the feeling of fear as the source of religion,

although as partial in its outlook as the above two theories, has nevertheless something to say in its favour. At the start of human life on earth, the roaring of the cloud, the whistling of the wind and the dances of the waves in oceans obsessed men's minds with a feeling of helplessness. For the sake of self-preservation solely, they bowed down before them, prayed for their mercy and assistance for the protection of their life. Anthropomorphically they imagined in them deities human-like in form, but more powerful and probably more merciful too. This belief in God, born of fear, might have some justifications or truth behind it, but for that it will be a mistake and a travesty of truth to imagine that the feeling of fear alone, divorced from thought and will, could create an idea of God or an atmosphere of asceticism and devotion. The emotion of fear rests, although in some cases vaguely, on the idea of an object of fear, obviously a creation of the intellect, and exhibits also a sort of conative urge, physical and mental, to do something for the avoidance of the fear. Each of the psychical activities involves, in different degrees in different cases, all the aspects of the human mind, which is not merely feeling, merely thinking or merely willing nor is it simply a name given to the sum-total of them all. It is an organic unity that comprises them all within its fold, and is yet something beyond them. Each of the above faculties might have its partial contribution to make towards what a man aims at in religion, but in the spiritual intercourse of a devotee with his God, or in religion in all its significance, the whole of the man is involved in his attempt at the realisation of the whole of the reality. Like man, religious consciousness also is an organic unity. It has equally a historic growth of its own. Religio-

sity is an inborn tendency in children, transformable by family tradition and environmental influences. At this stage, it is primarily emotional in leanings, all other aspects of mind remaining at the background. A feeling of helplessness, necessitating security at the bosom of the parents, getting strengthened by the responses made to the call of the child in need by the father, whom the child recognises as such, plays an important role in the formation of the idea of God, in whom he finds the figure of his earthly father projected. Lack of the sense of individuality, self-help and self-sustainability in a child speaks for the birth of the feeling of dependence on the earthly father, transferred, in the course of the awakening of religious consciousness, to the God in heaven. By nature emotional, the child wonders at all that he visualises in the world and imagines a God behind each of these wonders. Of the three stages, in the opinion of Dr. Harm, the spiritual consciousness of the children as evident in the "fairy-tale stage" is the first one. The next two stages are the "Realistic" and the "Individualistic" stages respectively. The last one heralds and is heralded by the birth of adolescence in man. Mature in body and mind, a youth develops personality in him. He is no longer a replica or a prototype of his mother, kneeling down machine-like with his mother before the altar in the church. He is now a self-conscious and self-determining agent. He develops a keen sense of "I" and "Mine" as opposed to "Thee" and "Thine". He is the subject freely and, in his own way rationally, regulating his activities, physical and mental according to his own conception of what is right and what is wrong, what is good and what is bad, that may or may not agree with that of others. Here as

also in other spheres of life, he entertains a conscious and often independent opinion with regard to the existence or non-existence of God or the manner in which, as in religion, he is related to God. Temperamentally more emotional than intellectual, some of the youngsters conform to the faith of the forefathers without questioning, and therein they find their spiritual bliss. A few of them, more assertive than submissive, more intellectual than emotional, often rebel against all conventions and authorities, God and religion being no exception. They go in for materialism with all its implications. There is yet another or the third type of the adolescents, who are favoured by circumstances and fate to get into touch with the saints of superior spiritual understanding and to have all their religious doubts and conflicts, so frequently detectable in the seeking souls, eager to see God, resolved for good through their aid and guidance. They possess harmonious and integrated souls unruffled and undisturbed by the stress and strain of the world outside. To them religion is vital and God is the only covetable Reality. Love for, and unshakable faith in, God gets automatic fruition in the shape of reverence for and worship of Him. Worship, analysable into the forms of praise, prayer, thanks-giving, good deed and lastly meditation, reaches its culmination at the last one which again, at its peak height, obliterates the distinction between the worshipper and the worshipped, the subject and the object. The polarities between the subject and the object, the man and his God, however much necessary, as Dr. Galloway writes in his book (*The History of Religion*, P. 82), at the initial stage of religious pursuits, have got no significance, when the man sees his God in him or him in his God. The two coalesce into the one and there is identity in place of duality. "*Brahmavid Brahmaiva*

Vavati". The knower of Brahman or the Absolute becomes Brahman or the Absolute himself. He cries out saying "I am God." "*Siva Aham*". The excess of religion ends in non-religion and certainly not in irreligion.

MORALITY AND RELIGION

That the relation between the two is very intimate is undeniable. A truly religious saint cannot help becoming ethically good in conduct and character. Likewise, a truly ethical man cannot but raise questions on the Ultimate, and make a search for it. The thinkers, however, differ on the question of which one of the two is earlier to, or the source of, the other. A few of them go even to the length of denying the fact of their interdependence. Martineau, Kant etc., for example, hold that religion springs out of ethics. On the basis of common experience, it may be stated that, in almost all cases, honesty is associated with suffering and dishonesty with prosperity. Had this been the fact ultimate, none would have stuck to the former in preference to the latter. There is a belief in the supreme moral principle, otherwise called God, that shall administer justice to all concerned by way of punishing the guilty and rewarding the honest in the life or lives to come, if not in the present life. "As you sow, so you reap" is the law both of Nature and Providence. None can shake off the fruits of his own *karma*, which he must eat up. As for the theory of religion being the source of morality, the argument put forward by the sponsors of this theory, like Descartes, Locke etc., is that the feeling of religiosity is not anything abstract, detachable from the world of facts. Invariably does this feeling manifest itself in some forms of activities, outward and inward, that are in consonance with the principles of life based on spiritualism, and that speaks for morality. In this sense, morality arises out of religion. Morality is ever in touch with religion. They

are, so to say, interwoven with each other. If religion stands for the spirit, morality stands for the body. If the one points to the noumenon, the other hits at the phenomenon. One anticipates the other; they represent rather two sides of the same reality. Historically viewed, the crude religion of the primitive savages with an equally crude set of customs is no exception to the law. However repulsive to the mind, they are the historic basis of the present-day national and universal religions and the moral consciousness associated with them. "The primitive loyalty to the custom protected by the God was a discipline towards the development of the form of moral consciousness which prevails in the national religion. The custom of the father is gradually transferred into norm or principle of wider scope whose validity has deeper roots than bygone usage." (Galloway : *The Philosophy of Religion*, P. 196). The next argument in favour of religion being the origin of morality is that for the sustenance of peace and order in the world, God wills certain ways of life to be followed by human beings, who are at the summit of His creations, hitherto made. These ways stand for moral principles demanding obedience from persons willing to lead moral life. It virtually means that moral good, by itself, has no self-existence apart from the will of God. It is good only because the Providence wills it to be so, else it is no good. It deprives simultaneously the moral good of its worth and God of His ethical nature for, granting the theory is correct, God can, like a whimsical person, make and unmake moral excellences at His sweet will. The thing is that divinity and morality are not opposed to each other. In essence, what is divine is moral and what is moral is divine. If willing means a conative tendency towards an end or ends yet unattained, God has no end

unrealised, and in this sense, He has nothing to will. All follow automatically out of His nature. The third view is that each, at the start, is completely independent of the other, and has its own independent origin. Religion springs out of the feeling of fear and awe and comes prior to morality. The latter comes at a later stage, when the sense of extreme ego-centricity, detectable in brute-like human beings in the primitive jungle life, frustrates its own cause and paves the way to cosmocentricity. The maxim of "all to one's own self and none to others" brings one into collision with the rest in which none is benefitted. Naturally, therefore, a sense of expediency, although not of wisdom, always called forth by the stern necessity of self-preservation, prevails. They meet and formulate certain code of conduct binding on them all for the common good of all. All to 'one's own self' is replaced by 'Give and take.' This is morality only in embryo. This view does not appear to be a correct one. Expediency may lead to greater expediency, but on no account, to wisdom. "The ideals of the good and the expedient refuse to coalesce." Egoistic Hedonism may put on the garb of Altruism, but it is still in its kernel egoistic and sensual and cannot claim promotion to Eudaemonism or perfectionism. Moral consciousness, as such, cannot arise out of a selfish motive that adopts a policy of give and take for its own selfish end under the pretext of social good. "The nature of moral obligation suffers violence, when it is reduced to a mere means of promoting individual and social interests." (Ibid, P. 198.) Besides, it fails to explain how eventually this so-called morality gets fused with religion. If however, the assumption is that religion and morality are two thoroughly independent lines of business, never to cut or meet each other, the question is quite a different

one.. A man may be religious without being morally good and vice versa. Nietzsche represents many of the modern thinkers, when he says that "religion per se has nothing to do with morality." And actually there are a few of the ethical societies in the western countries that "give moral and social teachings apart from any religious creed." But is this divorce between the two possible? A bit of reflection on the term "Ought" of the science of morality points to the ever-surpassability of the moral Ideal beyond the good of the individual of the society or even of the human kind as a whole. If the incomprehensibility of God in totality is a drawback or a stigma that necessitates cancellation of religion as a pursuit in life, morality on the same ground has had no better lot waiting for it, for the moral ideal, if once reached, loses its own ideality. The unattainability of the complete whole furnishes the essence both of religion and morality. The thing is that they are co-present. At the dawn of human consciousness, intellect, emotion and volition, however undeveloped, all came into existence and acted together, although at times one might predominate over the other two. The religious restlessness for the unseen and the struggle for the attainment of the moral ideal ahead are but two sides of the same mind. They speak, however vaguely, for just what we mean by religion and morality. At a comparatively higher level of perfection, one coalesces with the other, for the ideal that they both aim at, is the realisation of the self which, in essence, is identical with the Absolute. "Goodness... signifies the full and harmonious realisation of human powers, the development of man in his essential nature," which is akin to that of God. To know the self is to know God. The ideal moralist and the moral idealist are but two names of the same person who, in himself, is a saint.

METAPHYSICS AND RELIGION

Similarity

Both aim at the fundamental or fundamentals that is or are at the back of the universe. Both attempt to get beyond the veil of phenomena in quest of the noumenon or noumena behind them. Both enjoin mental discipline as the prerequisite for the attainment of truth. Both have faith in the capacity of human mind to get into touch with the reality. Both underestimate phenomena in preference to the noumena. Both start with the ordinary experiences of life, which they do not deny but which they chasten and intensify.

Difference

They differ on the question of the method to follow. Metaphysics supports mainly the method of induction, and religion supports that of deduction. The former undertakes scientific treatment of the transcendental, and the latter encourages surrender to the spiritual. The former is primarily objective, and the latter is subjective in leanings. For the one rational investigation yields knowledge of truth, whereas for the other, love for and faith in God bring a devotee face to face with his God. The one has no preconceived notion of what it seeks, and the other starts with a belief in God, Whom it has to love, revere and obey. The one knows truth theoretically, and the other realises it practically. The one is rational in outlook, and the other is mainly emotional by temperament. The one is wider in scope inasmuch as it deals with the reality in its relation to

the world at large, and the other deals primarily with God in relation to man. The one is comprehensive enough to include all the elements of the human mind—thought, emotion and volition for investigation and study, the other is wedded mainly to the softer side of the human nature in its attraction for the ultimate. The one is for knowing, and the other is for feeling the truth as it is. The one is cosmocentric, and the other is ego-centric. The one wants to know the truth, and the other wants to touch it. The one satisfies the intellectual hunger, and the other fulfils the emotional need. The one belongs to the head of a man, and the other to his heart. In the words of Galloway, religion differs from metaphysics, "in beginning with the idea of God instead of reaching it at the last". In the case of religion, "it is terminus a quo" and in the case of metaphysics it is "terminus ad quem Philosophy treats the Absolute as primarily logical idea, religion regards it as object, the mind or spirit which appears and reveals itself" to man (See Galloway : *The Philosophy of Religion*, P. 42). For metaphysics, the reality is fundamentally impersonal and abstract ; for religion, it is personal and concrete. The one is extensive in scope, and the other is intensive in attitude.

There is, besides these points of similarity and difference, certain amount of antagonism between the two. Philosophy (metaphysics) is a dispassionate and disinterested study, but theology as the science or philosophy of religion is dependant on the religion, it supports. Each of the religions, as such, has a theology of its own. Its function rests with the explication and systematisation of the truths that the religion upholds. In recent times, mention may be made of the name of

Ritschl, who has supported the above view and has argued very strongly against the intrusion of metaphysics into the domain of religion. Truths of religion have to be taken as scientifically valid. If the philosopher is bent on developing a world-view, he must have it done on the basis supplied by religion.

Is this contention tenable ? Can there be a bifurcation of the human self into two sharply divided halves, one dealing with independent thought and the other with thought, as subservient to the needs of religion ? These are the questions that pose for a reply. As an organic unit, human personality is not divisible into independent parts, although each has a specific function within the whole. Considered from the objective side, "no single aspect of reality is cut off with a hatchet from the remainder, and to know any one thing, you must see its relations to other things." So "to understand the ethical and spiritual value of" any religion, "one must realise not merely its distinction from, but its relation to other religions" and, here in our case, we may add, to other relevant aspects of the reality that science and philosophy discover. In a unity no segregation is permissible, although differentiation is not objected to.

Whatever be the points of agreement and difference, or the nature of antagonism between the two, the fact that stands out conspicuous is that the one supplements the other. An emotionless metaphysics is dry and a thoughtless religion is blind and susceptible to the pitfall of hallucination and illusion. The fact is that serious thought is always associated with an emotion of love for the object thought of. Similarly, love for God anticipates an amount of knowledge of God, for none

can have love for an unknown thing or a person. That is why a thorough-going metaphysician or a scientist becomes, in the majority of cases and at his journey's end, spiritual; and a spiritualist, on the contrary, turns up an acute thinker or a metaphysician. "*Jnan* and *Bhakti* always go together and cannot be separated, one from the other, for all time to come.

ART AND RELIGION

The values of the world are summed up in three words, viz., Truth, Beauty and Goodness. Religion is fundamentally the consciousness of, and a sort of relation of man to God, who is taken to be the personification of this Triad. The beauty that a poet depicts in his poem, a sculptor in his statue or a painter in his picture, is but partial manifestation of that supreme beauty, brought into shape on a sheet of paper, on a piece of marble or a canvas. The very fact that beauty is not in the mind of the poet alone, nor solely in the object outside, and that it always points to something beyond, is the sufficient indication of the excellence of that highest reality in which the Triad and, in this particular case, beauty in its fullness, reach their consummation. God is thus both in the beginning and at the end of the Triad. Art dealing with beauty comes within the orbit of religion. "A thing of beauty is a joy for ever." God being identical with the ideal beauty is a joy of the human beings and that for ever. The idols and the temples of the Hindus, the mosques of the Muslims, the church of the Christians are all made beautiful, pure and clean, so that the most beautiful and the most pure may appear in them in response to the call of man in course of his prayer and worship. "In the works of art thus dedicated to religious uses great differences in the feeling for aesthetic values are displayed by different nations. The statues and temples reared by the Babylonians and the Assyrians impress us by their vastness and monotony, not by their beauty. In ancient Egypt, art was developed on

similar lines. Here we find symbolism worked out in massive forms, significant of mystery and suggestive of the triumph of life over death, rather than a feeling for the beautiful in itself..... Greece is the conspicuous illustration of the interpenetration of aesthetic and religious feeling, and of the free use of artistic forms to reveal religious values. The native feeling of the Greeks for symmetry, rhythm, and harmonious synthesis was embodied in the structure of temples, in the forms of gods and goddesses, and for the first time there was discovered the significance of beauty in religion." (Galloway: *The Philosophy of Religion*, P. 205.)

Christianity, with its native fascination for transcendentalism in religion, gets scent of, and revolts against the fact of, immanence as is evident in the Greek blending of art with religion and of religion with art. Art deals with a world full of sin and discord, whereas religion aspires after a realm that is beyond the seen and the phenomenal and is full of bliss. The extremely antagonistic attitude of Christianity towards Art, as is seen in the middle age, gradually with the onward movement of religious experiences, softens down to the acceptance of art as a handmaid of religion, that may symbolise and suggest the spiritual truths, whose inner essence it cannot reveal. Symbolism with its suggestive character has often a great deal more to contribute towards the realisation of the reality than the utilisation of the rude senses or sometimes of the dry reason has. Of the artist, the musician and the poet, it has been said: "They teach us, backward younger brothers, to see, to hear, to feel what our rude senses had failed to detect. They enact the miracle of the loaves and fishes again

and again: out of the limited things of every day they produce a bread of life in which the generations continue to find nourishment." (Ibid, P. 209.) Emotional ecstasy is an element in the worship of the Supreme, that the Art caters to the human hearts. And in this sense, Art is a close associate of religion, whose innumerable aspects are not merely intellectual nor volitional but emotional as well. Each of the elements has its specific place and function in the Ultimate. The science of Aesthetics, although essentially one with that of the Divine, is not, for that alone, regarded by many as completely identical with it in the phenomenal level of existence. "Art for Art's sake" is, with the modernists, a slogan to give or a motto to follow. A slave of the senses and deprived of the spiritual significance in life, the artist deciphers a kind of beauty in the face of a girl which, if anything, is not that of the spirit, that the girl possesses, and that of which the said beauty is an external manifestation. The real source of the beauty is lost sight of in preference to the unreal and the impermanent. The love that a man feels for his concubine is the same love that a devotee bears unto his deity, only misdirected. He also falls into the same error, when he mistakes the idol, the mosque or the church for his God. Sentiments and imagination, unguarded by reason, have got chances of lapsing into such errors. In this sense, no doubt Art is an independent course of study like other courses of study, when detached from the science of religion. But here the science of beauty attains to the status of independence at the cost of its own beauty.

THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN NEO-REALISM

Religion is the bundle of a variety of experiences roughly analysable into the Objective and the Subjective. Objectively there is an all-comprehensive spiritual reality, infinite, omniscient and omnipotent. The finite Universe, created or evolved (in whatever sense we use it) is an infinitesimal part thereof. The relation subsisting between the two is one of interrelation and permeation. In every part of the world, there is the manifestation of this selfsame reality, call it God, the Universal Experience or the Absolute, as you please. There is, evidently a gradation in the process of manifestation from the lower to the higher, the level of humanity being the highest of all, till now reached. It is here that God becomes conscious of Himself, and man inquisitive of things in and around him and about his own self. This leads him on to the quest of the Self of all selves, that is, God. Here comes in the subjective aspect of religion. The ever-changing world with its woes of birth and death, disease and disaster naturally leads one to seek for a safe anchorage somewhere that is immune from the ravages of time and space; and this anchorage, the theists believe, is God. To get at it or Him, what is primarily necessary is the serenity of the body and mind, consequent upon the cessation of the turmoils of passions, that disturb the clear vision of truth. This serenity being granted, the intellectual curiosity of man about the fundamental and unchangeable reality ushers in love for it and inspires him to activities conducive to the satisfaction of his God. The whole of man is thus involved in the

study and realisation of the whole of reality. These are, in short, the dominant features of Religion. How far the Neo-realistic thoughts comply with them is what we have to gauge.

Neo-Realism is a revolt against all traditional philosophies, specially Idealism. It attempts at getting back to the commonsense theory of man about things in and around him and about ways of having contact with them. But for this, it does not lapse into Naive Realism. Commonsense, chastened by science, is instrumental to the study of both Science and Philosophy. The method of science, therefore, is the method of philosophy. Analysis and not synthesis, observation and not intuition alone can get access to whatever reality there is for the human mind to grasp. God, as supernatural and noumenal reality, appears to be outside its purview and religion, consequently, seems to have little place in the scheme of Neo-realistic investigation for truth.

But can Religion, on that account only, be altogether banished from the domain of New Realism? Man as man, however much cosmically minded or encaged within the watertight compartment of observation and experiment, must have cravings for the unseen and the unknown, for it is that which lends charm to the seen and the known or, to be more precise, makes it what it is. "A triangle is what it is because of the unbounded space around it." So to a few of the Neo-realists, Religion is not an anathema but a problem to deal with. In place of God, Russell puts in Logico-mathematical concepts or Neutral entities, that do not exist but subsist in the subsistential realm. Like the indefinable

and indeterminate Absolute, the entities elude definition for, as the highest of all, they have got no higher genus to refer to and, as non-existent, they have further no attributes to describe them with. In fact, they are nameless and the name given is simply an allowance to the poor intellect and the comprehensibility of human minds. Minus pluralism and the externality of relation that negate organic relation between the parts and the whole and a complete denial of the possibility of the conscious or the supra-conscious reciprocity or reciprocation between the worshipper and the worshipped, this assumption of Russell, to a great extent, fulfils the objective conditions of religion. Subjectively there is an intellectual passion for these eternal things, ending in the activities of the scientists, engaged in search of these truths. This is the Religion of the Intellectuals. The business of a thinker is to suppress the personal fears and hopes, in short, his emotional life in preference to the surrender of himself absolutely to the grim determination of the material. "To abandon the struggle for private happiness, to expel all eagerness for temporal desire, to burn with passion for eternal things—this is emancipation and this is the free man's worship." (See *Mysticism & Logic*, P. 55.) "But this surrender is no passive renunciation, for not by renouncing alone can we build a temple for the worship of our Ideals. Haunting fore-shadowings of the temple appear in the realm of imagination, in music, in architecture, in the untroubled kingdom of reason and in the golden sunset, magic of lyrics, where beauty shines and glows, remote from the touch of sorrow, remote from the fear of change, remote from the failures and disenchantments of the world of fact." (Ibid, P. 52.)

If Russell finds his God in Neutral entities, Spaulding identifies his God with values only. "God is the totality of values both existent and subsistent—in short, the Principles of the conservation of values and their efficiency." (The New Rationalism, P. 517.) He is, so to say, the combination of Truth, Beauty and Goodness, answerable to the demands of the intellect, emotion and volition of man. So far so good. But what about the non-values of the world which are, truly speaking, more in number than the values and a few of these entities as mentioned by Spaulding himself, are Space, Time, Evil, Ugliness etc. (See *New Rationalism*, P. 518.) If they do not inhere in God, they are outside of Him and there is, therefore, alongside the Principle of Values an equally strong, if not stronger, Principle of the Disvalues of the world. Mr. Cohen is right in his apprehension that in the world in which the Realists live, all Gods and goods may meet with defeat. (See *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXV, P. 382.)

For Whitehead, there is nothing outside God and, in this sense, his is an improved conception of God and Religion. God permeates the world and, at the same time, transcends it. The universe as a spatiotemporal flux, divisible into actual entities, each of which, like the monads of Leibnitz, is an organism prehending the rest, plus the eternal objects of, whose various possible forms of actualisation the present world is only one, constitute what he calls God. But who makes this choice of the actualisation of the eternal objects in and through the actual entities in this particular form of the world in preference to all others? Whitehead wants to say that He is God. He is, therefore, not only

the principle of actualisation but of limitation too. This power of selection, if any, is an indication of consciousness in God. That he is conscious is proved from another standpoint also. Each actual entity is itself, a subjective core of experience. God being the Entity of all entities, both actual and eternal or, in other words, the Organism of all organisms, is Himself a subjective core of experience and, as such, He is personal. A personal God is what theism wants, and thus far Whitehead satisfies the theists. But his God is, after all, an imperfect being. God as the Universal organism, unlike what is upheld by Hegel and which because of its perfection, is static, is for Whitehead in perpetual movement onward. God and the world are both in the merciless grip of the 'Creative Advance', which pushes them on from novelty to novelty, that stops nowhere. God is helpless in its hand. This helplessness or imperfection in God has been more than compensated in the philosophy of Alexander. The Creative impulse of Whitehead is analogous to the *nisus* of Alexander, which is not anything beside God, but is in God. God, for Alexander, is the totality of Space-time, emergence etc., in its *nisus* towards deity which, in the truest sense of the term, is the ideal ever to be followed but never to be reached, for that would mean either the death of the *nisus* or the emergence of qualities higher than the deity. In the process of Spatio-temporal complexes there is, at every stage, an emergence of a new quality which, in relation to the preceding stage, is its deity. In this sense, Angels, who are imagined by Alexander to be just ahead of the level of mind are the gods for men to worship. As these gods are only imaginary beings, Alexander means to say that God is what we worship and that we do not worship what is God.

The datum of worship is the religious sentiments. These sentiments, however, do not hang in the air. They find their God of worship in the entire universe composed of matter, life and mind which form, as it were, the body of God, whose soul is the deity towards which the world is ever moving. Soul or deity, when detached from the universe, stands for God that Theism wants, and for Pantheism, the universe plus the deity is an apt conception. Apparently, all theories about God and Religion are upheld and justified. But what about the existence of God, the pivot round which all religions move. It appears that, for Alexander, religion is just like a marriage ceremony being held without a groom. However much vociferous Alexander might be about deity, the deity in its true sense or the godhood in God will never appear. The heart of a man cries for a supreme God and not for semigods here and there. Angels, although superior to man, are, after all, imperfect beings, when compared with still higher emergences that would follow through eternity. A feeling of our going out towards something not ourselves and greater and higher than ourselves, cannot long satisfy us, if that something does never actualise. The fact is that the actuality of God has been sacrificed by Alexander at the altar of His Ideality and Perfection. There is, no doubt, enough of religion in the philosophy of Alexander, but that is without a God.

From what we have seen above, we can now say that the Neo-realists, as a class, are not anti-God or anti-religion. Common human curiosity about and a sort of reverence for God, equally stir them up and a few of them have a lot to say about God and Religion. That they cannot wholly satisfy the normal religious demands is due to their usual bias for the scientific

method and cosmocentric tendency. Much of a common ground for Science and Religion has, however, been prepared by them; and we have been looking forward to days, when the long-drawn controversy between these two branches of knowledge will all be over. A true Realist will be a real Idealist and a true Idealist will be an ideal Realist. Ideal Realism and Real Idealism would mean the same thing.

HINDUISM

Hinduism is a unity in diversity. It is no ~~one~~ religion, but the Religion of many religions. To use a terminology of the science of Politics, it is a federal union with a very powerful centre that controls or guides the otherwise autonomous constituent states. *Sakta*, *Saiva*, *Ganapatya*, *Vaisnava*, *Brahmaism*, etc., are all self-sufficient faiths or modes of life leading, in their own way, to the realisation of the Supreme under different names and different forms, and yet they are all Hindu faiths and Hindu cults. What is it that unifies them all? What is that cementing factor? Hinduism is more a tradition than a kind of fixed dogmas or truths, revealed through a particular agency. It is '*apourusea*' that is, not man-made. Originally based on *Sruti* or *Vedas*, it embodies truths that are universal and are capable enough to absorb all that comes its way and is worthy of being so absorbed. Modern Hinduism, although rooted in the spiritual life of the Vedic Aryans, is a commingling of many faiths, say, the faiths of the Dravedians, of the Aryans, and even of those races who used to live in India prior and posterior to the advent of the Dravedians and the Aryans. Hinduism follows a process of scientific ascent from the crude idolatry to the loftiest conception of Monism, as sponsored by the *Vedanta* philosophy. If religion speaks for a relation between man and God, the degree of human comprehension of the Supreme, that differs from man to man or race to race, cannot be ignored. Assessment of human ability is as much a necessity in religion as in other spheres of life. Hinduism does not believe in thrust-

ing anything upon a man, which is more than what he can possibly bear. To a Hindu his God is always commensurate with his hunger for Him. As he seeks, so God appears. Idolatry is a frank confession of a man's inability to look beyond the world of matter. Extra-cosmic existence is more than what he can fully understand, and so his God of religion is made of clay, wood and stone, and yet for that, He is not only clay, wood or stone. There is the spirit behind, that the Hindu worships and wants to know. Aphorisms like "*Thagacca Ihatista*" etc., invoking the unseen into the seen idol, furnish ample proofs of how a Hindu mind wants to feel the 'chinmoy' behind the 'mrinmoy', the spiritual behind the material. The only difference is that, at this stage, he is unable to conceive the idea of the disembodied spirit, of the abstract apart from the concrete, of the Infinite except in terms of the finite. It is just the beginning of religious pursuits with infinite possibilities ahead. In its own place, it has its importance and aristocracy. The imperfection or ignorance in a man is not his sin. This is in fact one of the conditions in and through which the Omniscient and the Omnipotent manifests itself. "Our limited consciousness is to be used as an opening to a higher, infinite self-existence and beatitude. The limited and the unlimited, the imperfect and the perfect, are not perpetual opposites. Even the Advaita Vedanta asserts not only that there is opposition between truth and illusion, but also that the divine is here, in everything, that all this is that." (S. Radhakrishnan : Religion and Society, PP. 102 & 103.) The ascent is gradual, and as the Absolute is infinite, the process too is eternal. Yet, at every stage ahead, there is more and more of light and bliss with a nisus towards a still higher realisation. The Trinity of *Brahma*, *Mahes-*

war and *Visnu* typifies this movement onward. *Brahma* is the God of creation. The creation of strength in body as also in mind is a pre-requisite for any kind of serious pursuit that a man may take to in his life. It is more so in the case of a man of religion. The consummation of the highest Ideal anticipates the highest possible fruition of the physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual possibilities, latent in him. A man at his birth, therefore, is a votary of *Brahma*. As a sort of preparation before launching upon the investigation of the Supreme, he passes through the discipline of *Brahmacarya* which means self-control, self-culture and acquisition of knowledge. He is required, at this period, to put up with his teacher at his residence and learn from him all that is necessary for him to live a useful life in future. His activity in *Garhastha Asram* next to *Brahmacarya* is a rehearsal of how well he should play his part in his life's drama in relation to the fellow human beings around him. By himself, he is not self-sufficient and he becomes full with his wife giving him children. She is thus called *Ardhangini*, equivalent to the English synonym of Better-half. Love for his own wife and children is just the beginning of his love for others in preference to his own self. In so doing, he gradually transcends the limitations of the Finite and craves for the Infinite. He begins to feel that he loves his wife not for the sake of wife alone, but for the sake of the spirit in her. Similarly, he loves his children not because of the fact that they happen to be his children, but because of the fact that they are the physical embodiments of the divinity within them. All his thoughts, his deeds, in spite of their social implications and certain amount of outward show, are at bottom, his heart-felt offerings at the altar of his deity. Egoistic or cosmocentric tendency, so very strong in ordinary men of

the world, bends before the call of the Divine in him, in the quest of whom he breaks finally through the barriers of family ties and social entanglements, betakes himself to a mountain-cave or to a desolate nook in a dense forest. His functions as a social creature cease to exist, and he is given to the meditation of the higher problems of life that concern the spirit. *Karma* is replaced by *Sadhana*, the outward activity by inward devotion to the deity. The soul is his only concern. The pictures of his family, country, nation, etc., fade away from before his mind's eyes. He came alone to the world and goes back alone in the last journey of his life. From the domain of *Brahma*, that encompasses the stages of *Brahmacarya* and *Garhastha*, he thus creeps, slowly but steadily, into the region of *Maheswar*, the supreme embodiment of the virtue of renunciation and devotion. Here a Hindu is in constant meditation of his God, forgetful of the past and indifferent to the future. This is *Vanaprastha* culminating finally in *Sannyas* in the life's journey of a Hindu. A *Sannyasin* is he who has realised his own self. A liberated spirit as he is, he has attained a state of spiritual freedom that is above all bondage, physical or mental. Honour or dishonour, success or failure, are all equal to him. He covets nothing, for he is not in want of anything and yet, without any feeling of attachment that binds a man down to the earth, he is full of love and compassion for his fellow creatures, for they are the creations of his God. His love for God is reflected in his compassion for His children. Jesus gave his life up on the cross not for men as men on earth, but as the children of his Father in heaven. In *Sri Bhagavat*, Pralhad refused to accompany the Lord Visnu to his abode in Baikūntha, when offered, leaving behind his fellow brethren suffering from the agonies of birth and

rebirth, life and death. "I desire not the supreme state of bliss, nor cessation of birth and rebirth. I am ready to take up the sorrows of all creatures who suffer and enter them so that they may all get free from grief"—is the gist of the religion that *Bhagavata* preaches. *Bhagavat dharma* with the Lord Visnu as the Idol is exclusively a religion of love and good will. The rigidity in the everyday life of a man, as prescribed for the *Brahmacarin*, the house-holder and, to some extent, for the mendicant in the forest or in mountain, slackens down to the point of nullity in the case of a *Sannyasin*, whose whole being is too pure and enlightened to admit of any moral injunction or ordinance and is, so to say, purity and love personified. He is a *Vaisnava*. The Lord *Maheswar*, the prince of the *sannyasins*, is also the prince of the *Vaisnavas*. While the Gods like *Indra*, *Varun*, etc., drank the nectar, He, for the benefit of the world, drank off the poison Himself. This is a state that an ordinary man can only imagine, but cannot fully understand or realise, unless lived through. This is the highest of the Ideals for a Hindu to strive for. What is true of an individual person is equally true of the Hindus taken collectively. The institution of caste, however degenerated, has some spiritual meanings latent within. The Sanskrit synonym of caste is *varna*, meaning colour. Fortunately or unfortunately, India has been the meeting-place of different races with different colours and cultures. A few of them settled down permanently in India. Racial conflict became inevitable. There were various ways, historically recognised, out of it, that is, extermination, subordination and lastly absorption of one race by the other. The Vedic Aryans, otherwise called the Hindus, thought it wise to adopt the last one, for extermination was identical with the extinction of

all its potentialities of which the exterminating agency, however civilised, could never have had any foreknowledge. Subordination, likewise, hampered its natural growth and progress. Each man must be given freedom of expression. The caste system of the Hindus is an affirmation of the above fact of infinite diversities in man, taken individually or in group. Originally caste was based on individual temperaments, leanings and the vocations of life and not on birth. At the beginning, there was only one caste. Either all were Brahmins or all were Sudras. A *Smṛiti* text says that a man at birth is a *Sudra*, and he becomes a *Brahmin* by austerity and purification. "*Janmanayate Sudra Samskaraia Dviya Ucyate.*" Four sons, born of common parents, may one become a Brahmin and the remaining three '*Ksatriya*, *Vaisya* and lastly *Sudra* respectively by their deeds or the courses of life that they adopt. "The Brahmins are the priests. They should have neither prosperity nor executive powers. They are the seers who constitute the conscience of the society. The '*Ksatriyas* are the administrators, whose principle is reverence for life. The '*Vaisyas* are the traders and the craftsmen, men of technical ability, who aim at efficiency. The routine workers, the proletariat, are the *Sudras*. They take no interest in their work as such, when they carry out instructions and contribute only a fraction. They lead a life of innocent impulse and adopt traditional ways. Their joy is in the fulfilment of family obligations of marriage and parenthood and other personal relationships." (S. Radhakrishnan: *Religion And Society*, P. 129). Yet the *Sudra* is not denied the chance of attaining to the status of a *Brahmin* or a *Brahmin* descending to the position of a *Sudra*. All depends on one's *karma* — physical, mental and moral. *Janaka* and *Visvamisra*, although *Ksatriya* by

birth, were raised to the status of *Brahmin* by virtue of their spiritual deeds, wisdom and excellences of character. Similarly, *Dronacarya*, *Parasurama*, etc., became virtually *Ksatriyas* by profession.

It is worthy of note that, even to a superficial observer, Hinduism bears, as if in its embryo, the inceptions of all religions of the world. Between Christ and Krishna or Christianity and Vaisnavism, there is a lot of affinity. Equally there is a kind of similarity between the Fire-worship of *Zarathustra* and the *Agni*-worship of the Indo-Aryans. It encourages polytheism for the comparatively less advanced type of men. Like Christianity and Islam, it preaches Monotheism. Yet unlike both of them, which admit existence of realities besides God, Hinduism supports the theory of Monism as the highest Ideal in the religious pursuits of human beings. *Brahman* is one with no second beside or beyond Him. Multiplicity of the world thrives on the ignorance of man and vanishes with the dawn of wisdom in him. *Iswar* or personal God has His necessity for those only, who are comparatively lower than the fully enlightened. The *Gayatri* sums up the truth of Hinduism in a few words. "We meditate on the self-illuminous Spirit residing in the heart of everything and pervading the earth, the heaven and the infinite space around. Let Him guide us in the path of right conduct." The *Gayatri* is therefore, regarded by some as the essence of the Vedas and by some as *Veda-mata* or the mother of the Vedas. What is cryptically stated in the *Gayatri* is more elaborately illustrated in the *Bhagabat Gita*. In importance, the *Gita* stands near only to the Vedas. Read it and you get the entire Hindu Philosophy of religion in a nutshell. (Dr. S. C. Chatterje: *Tattvajignasa*, Pp. 83-84.)

QUINTESSENCE OF THE GITA *

Bhagavat Gita is at once a bunch of songs and lessons. It epitomises wisdom and knowledge, accumulated through centuries by the seers of India. The procedure adopted is one of questions and answers between a teacher and a taught. The teacher represents God in human flesh and blood and the taught is the representative man with all his worth and frailties. Questions put are the common queries of human hearts awaiting eternally solutions from a God. The place chosen fit for such a discussion is a battle-field where life and death, the puzzle of all puzzles, stand face to face with each other. What is man essentially? Did he exist before birth or will he survive death? Is there any possibility of getting out of the cycle of birth and rebirth?—these are the problems that confront every seeking heart. Such a seeking soul Arjuna is. The earth in him draws him to the earth and his spirit looks up to the heaven. The tussle between the physical and the metaphysical, between the bad and the good, between the desired and the desirable, is a common experience of all men, big or small. At the crucial juncture of his life in the battle-field of *Kuruksetra* where life's battle is finally won or lost, Arjuna falls a victim to such a conflict arising out of ignorance or *Maya*. The *preyah* gets the better of the *sreyah*, the existence supersedes the essence. Here the self phenomenal gets detached from the self noumenal and poses self-sufficiency. Like a common human being whom Arjuna typifies, he challenges Krishna about the propriety of killing the enemies, on

various grounds—social, moral and religious. This indicates, however, no setback in life, but a state of intellectual darkness or '*Tamah*' that, in all cases, precedes the advent of light in life's journey towards its spiritual end. In this light only shines the face of his God — '*Aditya barnam tamasah parastat.*' A sincere seeker as Arjuna is, he eventually recollects himself and falls, in an attitude of unconditional self-surrender, at the feet of his teacher for guidance and help. And here virtually the teachings of the *Gita* begin. In these days of 'give and take' relationship between the teacher and the taught, this will certainly provide a lesson for us all to learn. It is unconditional surrender on the part of the disciple that provokes the best in the master to come out. So it does come out, when Krishna gets satisfied as to the sincerity of Arjuna and his dependence on Him. Before that not a single drop of nectar of the *Gita* does he pour down the throat of Arjuna; and this we may note with profit. A true teacher, like an able physician, diagnoses faultlessly what is ailing in his student. The ideal teacher Krishna makes a similar diagnosis in respect of his equally ideal student Arjuna and finds out that, after all, for all practical purposes, man is flesh first and spirit next. A man cannot all at once jump into a life divine with a bony shackle aching behind. The march forward is from the earth to heaven and not from heaven to earth or from spirit to body, as is bound to happen in the case of an *Avatar*. *Karmayoga* that pertains more to body than to soul is, at the start, therefore, prescribed for Arjuna to practise as a discipline, meant for the realisation of the self. The life-germ or protoplasm is ever pulsating with vitality. *Karma* is coextensive with life. Whether a man wants it or not, there is constant activity in him. The process of the circulation of blood, inhalation and exha-

lation of air etc., know no stop till life persists. The question, therefore, is not so much of complete cessation of work as of proper utilisation of the same for the betterment of one's self. By nature egocentric, a man is prone to work for him only or, at any rate, for those whom he calls his own. Vedic sacrifices virtually mean opening of Bank Accounts with God in heaven to fall back upon after death. Besides aggravating thirst, bank balance has its end too. It brings no satiety. Bliss is out of question. For that other ways have to be found out. *Karmayoga* is one of them. Every man has a definite station in life which enjoins upon him certain specific duties to perform. To carry them out for the sake of them alone with no selfish end in view is, in short, the truth that *Karmayoga* preaches. Here it differs from the Buddhistic theory of inaction. For the *Gita* inaction, if it means anything, is action without any hope of reward. It prefers 'niskarmata' to 'naiskarma'. The attitude of disinterestedness, on the part of the doer, in respect of the fruits of all his actions gradually slackens the rigidity of the flesh, cleanses the body and purifies the blood. Soon he gets over egoism that binds him down to the earth and the earthly. Lust, greed, attachment etc., all become things of the past. The notion of 'I and mine' is replaced by that of 'Thee and thine' to whose superior will he surrenders his own. Henceforth he is an instrument only in the hand of his God to whose direction alone the stream of all his activities flows. Personally he has nothing to lose or gain in the world. He is free and *mukta*. He has attained *moksa* or liberation through right conduct. Right thinking or *Jnan* and right devotion or *Bhakti* may equally lead to the same goal. Although not mutually exclusive, each is essentially an independent means to the end of the libera-

tion of the soul from the bondage of the body. Ethical discipline is a prerequisite for the metaphysical speculations to follow. Illumination dawns upon a mind that is free from the ruffles of passions. Hence psychologically speaking, *Karmayoga* comes prior to *Jnanayoga*. The *Gita* admits of two kinds of knowledge—*vijnana* and *jnana*. The former deals with the visible, while the latter tackles the invisible. The one is lost in the diversities of the world that lack self-sufficiency and the other seeks out the unity that binds them up together and gives them meaning. The intellectual apprehension of science is supplemented by the mystical insight of philosophy. The latter is not the negation of the former but its fulfilment. *Jnana* is more like a boon from above than an acquisition, made by personal efforts. What a man can achieve is something like preparedness, both physical and mental, for the divine grace to come down. And this achievement is possible through 'pranipat', 'pariprasna' and 'seva'.

"Tadbiddhi pranipatena pariprasnena sevaya
Upadeksanti te jnanam jnaninah satwadarsinah."
(Chap. IV. 34 B. G.)

Know the truth by reverence, inquisitiveness and service. Wise men who have seen the truth will instruct thee in knowledge. Once awakened to the sense of the real, he knows no slumber of 'avidya' again. The manifold of the phenomenal world, born of ignorance, vanishes in favour of the One—the Brahman. He is all and all is in Him. *Viśvarūpdarsan* is a testimony thereof. The *brahmavid* is no exception. '*Brahmavid Brahmaiva bhavati*'. The knower of Brahman becomes, as it were, Brahman himself. Without denying the theory of monism, the *Gita* does not appear to have encouraged

the concept of identity (B.G. XII. 2). An unimaginably thin veil, beyond human comprehension, seems to separate the One from the other. For all purposes, they are identical. The will of man becomes one with the will of God and *vice versa*. A *Jivanmukta* or a liberated soul, like his deity, is above all cosmic bonds of 'karma'. He finds 'karma' in 'akarma' and 'akarma' in 'karma' (B.G. IV. 18). Although he does not cease working, the effects of 'karma', good or bad, cannot cling to his self. In himself, he is free and 'siddhakama' having nothing to want.

Such a spirit naturally loses himself in an ecstasy of love for his God like of which we fail to comprehend at our present level of existence. God is the source of truth, beauty and goodness. The world, as we find, is true because of His truth, beautiful because of His beauty and good because of His goodness. Minus Him, it is untrue, ugly and evil. Love for others is, in essence, love for one's own self. God is the supreme Self of all selves. So attraction for or attachment to Him is automatic and spontaneous, once the shadow of 'Avidya' is removed through ethical discipline and philosophic wisdom. Logically, therefore, *Bhaktiyoga* or the cult of devotion and love comes next to *Karmayoga* or *Jnanayoga*. But this does not mean denial of independence to *Bhaktiyoga* as an original method of approach to the Supreme. Man does not live in parts or fraction. The whole of being is involved in the study and quest of the whole of reality. Thinking, feeling and willing, corresponding to *Jnana*, *Bhakti* and *Karma*, are not in a state of juxtaposition—one to the other. While maintaining their distinctiveness as methods of approach, they anticipate and supplement one another. *Jnana* without love and service

is dry. Love, self-centred and uncontrolled by reason, fans lower passions in a man. Lastly *karma*, devoid of *jnana* and compassion for others, leads to greater bondage of soul to the body. The difference is one of degree only with regard to the predominance of the one over the other two.

As in human relation, so in the relation of man with his God, the tie of love is the strongest and perhaps the softest too of all the ties hitherto known to us. Here the moral struggle, religious restlessness and intellectual quickenings—all cease to exist. In an atmosphere of spiritual quietude, the devotee and his God get closer to each other in an attitude of mutual dependence and reciprocity. *Bhakta* and *Bhagawan*, like two relative terms, point each to the other. In loving his God, the *Bhakta* loves his creation. In every face he finds the face of his beloved hidden. There is none whom he can afford to hate. He feels for his enemy, even when he strikes him. 'Father, forgive them, they know not what they are doing'—is an eternal solicitation of a life divine to his Master for the regeneration of his fellow beings, gone astray. He does not worry so much about his own salvation as about the redemption of the suffering humanity around him. He lives in and for them, atones for their sins and yet he is not one of them. In the midst of the multitude he is, in fact, a solitary being in constant communion with his God alone. His love for his God and God's love for him has a peculiarity, all its own, that often eludes ethical evaluation. *Bhagawan* in His attitude towards His *Bhakta* is more human than divine, more emotional than rational.

.....*Naham basami Baikunthe Yoginam hridaye na cha Madbhakta yatra tisthanti tatra tisthami Narada*—

I live not in *Baikuntha* nor in the heart of the *yogis*. I am with my devotees wherever they are. This aphorism indicates a differentiation made in favour of the devotees. The climax is reached when the Lord urges Arjuna to declare on oath to the world that His *bhakta* shall never perish. '*Pratijanihi Kaunteya na me bhakta pranasyati*' (B.G. IX. 31.). Of all the promises, made by the Lord in the *Gita*, this is probably the most heartening one. It surpasses all others in beatitude and its far-reaching effects on the psychosis of man. It brings hope to the hopeless, strength to the weak and gives a push ahead to the spirit already on way to self-realisation.

CHRISTIANITY

Christianity is associated with the name of Christ. Many years ago, on the first Christmas day, he was born in Bethlehem. Mary, his mother and Joseph his father had travelled from a far-off land. They were naturally very tired and, as strangers in Bethlehem, could secure no place for shelter and rest other than a stable wherein the baby Jesus was born and laid on a bed of straw in a manger. Heavenly Angels kept vigilance on the baby and his mother. The animals of the stable walked out stealthily so as to avoid noise that might awaken the baby who was in sleep. It was night. The sky was crystal clear and the stars were shining brightly. One of them, just above the stable, was shining much brighter than all others. Just at the moment, near a hill, not far away from the stable, a band of shepherds were tending their sheep. Suddenly they found a bright light appearing in the sky and heard a voice saying, "Be not afraid, I bring you tidings of great joy. Unto you this day, a Saviour is come in the town of Bethlehem." In reply, one of the shepherds said, "Come, we must go to Him." So saying, they started on their way with the shining star above their heads to guide them. Equally, at the same time, the wise men from the East were following the star and finally arrived at the stable with the shepherds. They all together entered the stable and gazed at the face of the baby Jesus in wonder. The wise men and the shepherds all fell to their knees and raised their heads in worship and praise. The wise men further offered their gifts of gold, frankincense and

myrrh to mother Mary saying, "We come from afar and bring gifts to the baby, who is to be the Saviour of the world." And the sleeping baby, it is said, moved a little and smiled. Joseph and Mary were very poor, and so they could not afford to send Jesus to a school, when he grew up to be a little boy. But very pious and god-fearing as they were, they felt that Jesus was really the son of God and as such, God would teach him all that he required to do God's work, which he eventually did. He had no fine garments to wear nor any toy to play with. He was nevertheless very happy, helping his father all the day long in his small workshop, and gradually learned to be a carpenter himself. As he grew older and older, he became more and more thoughtful and contemplative. He began to think and talk more about his heavenly Father than about things worldly and temporal. He decided to go out and tell people all about the love and mercifulness of his Father in heaven. He gathered around him a band of disciples, who loved him more than they loved themselves of anything else on earth. Jesus himself was a lover of man and particularly of children, who were naturally pure both in body and mind. It so happened once that, while Jesus was preaching to the people, his disciples sent away some children saying, "Go away, the Master is tired and can't be bothered with noisy children." And the children went away. When Jesus heard of it, he felt very sorry, and said to the disciples, "Suffer the little children to come unto me and forbid them not, for such is the kingdom of Heaven." And never again did the disciples send the little children away. Jesus's love for children, who were for him embodiments of heavenly virtues, knew no bounds. Once he brought back to life the dead child of Jairus, a ruler of the Synagogue saying, "Child, I say unto thee, arise."

And the Child woke up as if from sleep. The above happenings, being only two out of many, are indicative enough of the softness of his heart as also of the tenderness of the faith that he preached. God to him is more a personification of love and mercy than of righteousness and justice. His heavenly Father is ever ready to forgive his children for all their sins, if only they are sincerely repentant for what they have done. "Even though we have sinned and thus betrayed the God in us, yet if we turn to God in faith, He helps us out of the difficulty." (S. Radhakrishnan: *The Heart of Hindustan*, P. 85.) It is what speaks for the essence of Christianity. In respect of metaphysical doctrines, there is almost nothing to discriminate Christianity from Judaism to which it owes its origin. And actually Jesus did not pretend to set up a new religion. "Think not that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets: I am not come to destroy but to fulfil. For, verily, I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled. Whosoever therefore shall break one of these least commandments, and shall teach men so, he shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven: but whosoever shall do and teach them, the same shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven." (See Matthew, V.) But on problems, like the concept of God in His relation to man and the world as also of morality, Christianity differs considerably from the parent-religion—Judaism. Yahweh of the old Testament is pre-eminently a national deity and Israel, the chosen race. Heathens, even if they profess Judaism, occupy a position lower than that of the Israel. As against this, Christianity preaches cosmopolitanism. In Jesus's heavenly Father's mansion, every one has

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his rightful place to occupy. The doors are open to all and shut against none. He has only to enter with a clean body-mind and a devout spirit. To the Jews, God is more an object of terror than of love and reverence. Isaiah says, "Men shall go into the caves of the rocks and into the holes of the earth from before the terror of the Lord, and from the glory of His Majesty, when He ariseth to shake mightily the earth." (Chap. II, 19.) To Jesus, God is love with all its charm. He is the redeemer and forgiver of all the sins of his children. The God of the Jews, living far away from the earth, descends for the Christians, into human flesh and blood, so to say, in the person of his son—Christ. The transcendental God is, as the Holy Ghost, immanent in the world. The world of matter is permeated through and through by the spirit of God. The doctrine of the Trinity of God, the Holy Ghost and the Son, like *Brahma*, *Vishnu* and *Maheśwar* of the Hindus, is but different names of the self-same Reality. And verily, Christ himself has once said, "I and my Father are one". This is indeed a mystic expression, blasphemous to the ears of the Jews, but nevertheless, analogous to a similar expression of the Hindus like "I am *Brahman*". But for all these, Christianity does not believe in the theory of the incarnation of God. It appears to have maintained all through a veil, however thin, in between God the Father and Christ the son. Similarly to avoid the danger of Theism getting degenerated into pantheism, consequent upon the identification of the Holy Ghost with the world, the Christian thinkers readily define the Holy Spirit as a mere possession or a kind of emanation from God. God, as a person, cannot be dissipated into an impersonal essence of the world, although His

presence is ubiquitous. (See H. D. Bhattacharyya: *The Foundations of Living Faiths*, P. 309.)

Obviously, Christianity suffers from a mistaken conception that theism and pantheism cannot go together, and hence oscillates between the two. If pantheism means the presence of God in everything, there is certainly nothing to object to, for there is in fact, as upheld by all religions, nothing that is different from, and independent of, God; again no pantheistic thought, on the contrary, can ever avow that God is nothing more than, or is totally exhausted in, the universe. He is both in and outside the world of creation. Looked at from the standpoint of humanity, the Son represents the Father, from the side of the universe, the Holy Spirit stands for Him. The two are no independent identities, separable from each other and from God from whom they both emanate. They only speak for the different modes of activities of God. In the words of Prof. Radhakrishnan, "Abelard and, in a manner, Aquinas support the view of the Father as power, the old Yahaveh exercising judgment (*Siva*), the Son as the Logos, Word or Wisdom, the Principle of creation (*Brahma*), and the Holy Spirit as pervading love (*Vishnu*). On this view, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit correspond to the Vedantic formula of Brahman, Sat, Chit, Ananda—Reality, Wisdom, and Joy." (*The Heart of Hindusthan*, p. 90.) They may otherwise be called the Truth, Goodness and Beauty, Christianity, as a religion, gives greater emphasis on the goodness, than on the other two aspects of God. Like Buddhism, it is pre-eminently an ethical creed. Whether, or not, Christ was indebted to Buddhism for what he had preached, as a few people believed he was, there

is no denying the fact that in their moral precepts and teachings they are often in unusual agreement with each other. (See R. C. Dutt; *Civilisation in Ancient India* Vol. II, p. 328.) Truths are universal properties. They may simultaneously or successively, appear in different minds in different places or even at the same place. That there is much in common, however, in the teachings of both of the prophets is admitted by all. The following excerpts from Dhammapada, Matthew and Luke, out of many others, will bear ample testimony to the above statement.

1. What is the use of plated hair? fool! what of the raiment of goat-skins? Within thee there is ravening, but outside thou makest clean."—(Dhammapada, P. 394.)

2. "Woe unto you, scribes and pharisees, hypocrites! for ye are like whited sepulchres which indeed appear beautiful outward but are within full of dead man's bones and of all uncleanness." Matthew, (XXIII, 27.)

3. "And the Lord said unto him, Now do ye pharisees, make clean the outside of the cup and the platter: but your inward part is full of ravening and wickedness." (Luke Chap. XI, 39.)

Like Buddhism, Christianity entertains an extreme attitude with regard to the moral principles and to their day-to-day observance in life, and in so doing, Christianity steals a march over Judaism. If for Judaism, actual commitment of adultery is bad, for Christianity, the very lustful desire for a woman is worse still. The doors of heaven are shut not only against

the murderers, but against those as well, who are angry with or bear ill feelings against their brothers.

"You have heard that it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not kill: and whosoever shall kill, shall be in the danger of judgment. But I say unto you that whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause, shall be in danger of the judgment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council; but whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell-fire. Therefore, if thou bring the gift to the Altar; and then remember that thy brother hath angered against thee; Leave then thy gift before the Altar and go thy way; first be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift."

"Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: but I say unto you that ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also."

"You have heard that it hath been said, thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you." (See Matthew, Ch. V. 21—44.)

It is not the purity of the body only but of the heart and of the soul mainly that counts. Further, purity alone will not do. The heart must be full of love for God and compassion and sympathy for his fellow men so that even if a man harms a Christian, he may wish him good. Love for the Father naturally

trickles down to the love for His children. In loving God, Christianity has again stolen a march over Buddhism, which is scrupulously silent on the question of God, and as a matter of fact, of all metaphysical problems. Christianity like Vaishnavism is essentially a religion of love, based on morality.

The difference between the two is one of degree and range. Of the different aspects of love, Christianity emphasises only that which exists between the father and the son, the master and the servant. In Vaishnavism, on the contrary, love in all its branches, is taken account of, as ways of approach to God. In his relation to God, temperamental differences, as between man and man, are given full recognition. Philosophical contemplation, servant-like obedience, friendly attraction, parental affection and lastly conjugal attachment and romance are each, in its own way, a gateway to the city of God, if only properly pursued. Take to any of the paths and you see your God eye to eye. The Lord has promised in the Gita, "In whatever form men approach Me, in that form I accept them".*

* "Ye yatha mam prapadyante
tams Tathai'va bhajamyaham".

(S. Radhakrishnan: The Bhagavadgita,
Chap. IV, Sloke 11.)

ISLAM

Like Judaism and Christianity, Islam is a revealed religion. It is revealed through Mahammad. Mahammad was born at Mecca some fifty-three years before the Hijrah. He was a posthumous child, reared up by his grandfather, Abdul Muttalib, and after his death, by his uncle, Abu Talib. While quite a young boy, he travelled distant places like Syria with his uncle in the merchants' caravan. This he again did a few years hence as an employee of a well-to-do lady of the name of Khadijah who, struck by his character, eventually married him, although in age she was fifteen years older than him. This marriage gave Mahammad high status in the society and helped him a lot in the propagation of his new faith among the natives of Mecca. The Meccans believed that they were the descendants of Abraham through Ishmael and that Abraham was a believer in one God, for whom he built up the famous temple of the name of Kabah. In course of time, as it happens everywhere, intellectual and emotional degeneration set in, and the tribe of Qureysh to which Mahammad himself belonged, gave up regional monotheistic belief in preference to polytheistic faith with the result that the Kabah finally became the abode of so many of idols, representing the daughters of Allah and intercessors. The rationalists among them, generally known by the name of Hanifa, naturally resented the practice of many-god worship and idolatry, prevailing in the country. They were trying to find out what actually were the teachings of Abraham. Mahammad who was himself one of the Hanifas, used to betake himself every year with his family to a

desert-cave, known as Hira, for meditation. Once when in trance, he heard a voice say: "Read". Illiterate as Mahammad was, he in reply said that he did not know how to read. The voice again said, "Read"; out again came the same reply from Mahammad. The third time the voice commanded him rather sternly to read and read the following:—

"Read: in the name of thy Lord who createth,
Createth man from clot,
Read: And it is thy Lord the Most Bountiful
Who teacheth by the pen,
Teacheth man that which he knew not."
(Sur. XCVI, 1—5.)

The voice was that of Gabriel, the angel, whom Mahammad visualised all around him in the air, even after he had woke up from his trance. This was the occasion practically of his first initiation to the cult of Islam, which he preached as a prophet all his life and till his death. And verily, the voice again announced, "Oh Mahammad, thou art Allah's messenger and I am Gabriel." The oracular utterances that he henceforward used to make from time to time, while in a state of trance, formed the contents of the sacred book "The Quran", differentiable from Hadith or Sunnah that summed up Mahammad's talks and instructions, given in non-meditative moods. In the former case, Allah speaks through him, and in the latter, Mahammad the man speaks. His faith was and is one of uncompromising monotheism, which he preached for the first three years of his prophetic life only to the members of his family and very close and intimate associates. His first convert was his wife Khadijah, the second and the third were his first cousin Ali, whom he subsequently adopted and

his servant Zeyd, who was formerly a slave, respectively. Till then he had had no antagonism to face. It was only when he began to preach publicly his monotheistic doctrine of one God, to condemn belief in many gods and idolatry that the Qureysh, supporters of polytheism and idolatry, took up an attitude of active hostility to Mahammad and his followers. Short of murder, they did everything, humanly possible, to stop him from teaching and convert him back to their original polytheistic faith and idol worship. So cruel was the persecution that the followers, who were mostly drawn from the humble folk of the country and hence unable to defend themselves against the oppression of the Qureysh, were advised by the prophet to emigrate to the Christian country, Abyssinia for self-protection. Subjected to occasional attempts at ostracism (Sahifah), murder, etc., punctuated equally by occasional lifting of ostracism and endeavours for a compromise, Mahammad with a small number of converts fled to Yathrib, about 200 miles away from Mecca. Thence forward Yathrib was called Al-Madinah, "The city" per excellence. The flight to Al-Madinah or Yathrib, historically known as Hijrah, took place on the 20th of June, 622 A.D., marking the beginning of the Muslim Era. This also marks a difference between the life of Mahammad, the preacher, and Mahammad, the preacher-cum-ruler. Consequently, the Madinah-surahs differ considerably from the Meccan Surahs. The latter cater to the religious needs of individual souls as individual; the former give them guidance to conceive of themselves as a part and parcel of the growing social and political community, imbued with religious enthusiasm and spiritual idealism. He had his

soldiers, called the Ansars, to fight for the cause of the religion he preached and which, he believed to have been the only religion, acceptable to mankind. On receipt of a revelation, ordering him to wage war against the persecutors, (the Qureysh at Mecca) "until the persecution is no more and the Religion is for Allah only," the prophet had to be involved in war on several occasions with the non-believers (Qureysh) at Mecca and also with the Jews, till at last Mecca fell and Mahammad became the over-all ruler-cum-spiritual prophet of the whole of Arabia. Although he fought and shed blood, he did it not for any personal gain but for the cause of Allah and that at His command. Personally, he hated bloodshed and, as a matter of fact, proclaimed a general amnesty to all living in Mecca, when he entered the city as a conqueror. He forgave even the Jewish lady, who poisoned his food to kill him, and people said that the little of food that he took into his mouth, but did not swallow finally, brought about his end. The softer side of his nature did not appear to have touched his followers so much as his uncompromising hostility to idolatry and many-god worship did. And probably the slogan of "The Quran in one hand and a sword in the other" had its genesis there. "Let there be no compulsion in religion" was in all probability not intended for the idolators or the Apostates. (See Sura, ii, 257.) A well-authenticated tradition ascribes to Mahammad the saying, "I am ordered to make war on people till they say: There is no God but Allah." (H. D. Bhattacharyya: The Foundations of Living Faiths, P. 361.) And history bears witness to the fact that the followers of Islam, in the name of religion, periodically came out with swords in hands for world-domination both politically and theocratically. Dese-

cration of Idols, even today, appears to be a fashion with many of the Muslims. The spirit of mutual toleration might have its meaning and dignity, when it refers to religions professing one God. Heathenism has no place there. What actually was in the mind of the prophet or what exactly was his attitude to religions other than his own, is for the savants of the faith to come forward to explain and disseminate. Be it said, however, to the credit of the prophet that he preached a kind of monotheism that, in strictness, surpassed all revealed religions of the day, viz., Judaism and Christianity to which, no doubt, it owed its origin and drew its inspiration from. And the truths, as embodied in the Quran, agree in many respects with those in the Old and New Testaments. Still he is neither a Messiah nor the Son of God, for in either case, he is afraid, this will bring God down to the level of man or raise man to the status of God. God is transcendental and no dust of the world can ever touch Him. Mahammad was simply the slave of Allah, spiritually and materially distinct from him. How far he could adhere strictly to his monotheistic standpoint is debatable, owing to the fact that like Judaism and Christianity, Islam too believes in the existence of the Satan, co-present with God. If it is an allegory, and if an esoteric interpretation, as is given in the case of the Vedic Gods, *Indra* and the *Vrittrasura*, is possibly applicable to the case of Allah and the evil god, the situation is saved however. A simple and innocent soul, uncorrupted by the casuistries of intellectualism, as Mahammad was, the oracular utterances of the prophet followed no logical sequence in occurrences. He gave out as and when the revelations came and so they had been embodied in the Quran. But an intelligent investigator may detect points,

sufficient enough to formulate a theology out of what the prophet had stated from time to time. Unlike the God of the Christians, who is mercy and love personified, Allah of the Islam is mainly an embodiment of power, strength and justice. Both believe that the universe is the first and the last of its kind and that God created the world out of nothing. There is in existence an order of being higher than man. They are the angels having subtle bodies created by fire. They do neither take food nor propagate. Mention may be made of Gabriel, Azracl, etc. (See page 2 of *The Fountain-head of Religion* by Gangaprasad.) Likewise, there is also in existence an inferior class of beings called Jin or genii who, created of the fire of inferior kind, eat, drink and propagate like men, and are also subject to death. There is no rebirth, but there is resurrection to stand and face trial on the Day of Judgment. According to some thinkers, when the material body is entirely consumed by the earth, the resurrection relates only to the spirit of the man. But Mahammad differs. He retains one part of the body, that is, a bone called Al Ajb which remains uncorrupted till the last day, when out of it, as if from a seed, the body with the spirit sprouts out on the Day of Judgment. The sprouting is effected by a forty days' rain caused by Allah. There are certain outward signs signifying the approach of the Day of Resurrection and they are (a) the rising of the sun in the west, (b) the appearance of Dajjal, the monster, who will preach the truth of Islam in Arabic language, (c) the coming of the Mehdi, (d) the blast of the trumpet, called Sur, that shall happen three times. As a preliminary to the trial, the resurrected souls will have to wait for some time under the scorching heat of the sun, that shall

descend down to the close proximity of their heads. On the day, God will take his seat on the throne, Mahammad will take up the office of intercessor and Gabriel will hold the balance in his hand, weighing the books that record the good or bad deeds of men, the preponderance of which will, once for all, determine whether the man will go to heaven or hell. Every part or limb of the body will confess the sins that it has committed. But in spite of all these, unconditional faith in, and self-surrender to, Allah is sufficient for a believer in Islamic faith to get his salvation (See H. D. Bhattacharya: *The Foundations of Living faiths*, p. 380.) The Muslims will easily cross the bridge, called Al Sirat, over to heaven under the guidance of Mahammad, while the non-believers will miss their footings and drop down into the hell gaping below. The faithful with Mohammad will finally reach the paradise, which is otherwise called the seventh heaven, full of objects, that the senses crave for, including seventy beautiful girls called hur-ul-ayun on account of their very big and, at the same time, black eyes. Islam is a religion more of deeds than of thought and emotion. There are certain precepts, positive and negative, that all Muslims must follow. They are (1) Prayer (2) Fasting (3) Charity (4) Pilgrimage to Mecca. During prayer, the headman will stand in front of all with his face towards Kabah, and the rest will take their stand behind him. Simultaneously with prayer, they will pass through certain physical postures reminiscent of the semimilitary activities of the prophet. In fasting, the Muslims have to abstain not only from food and drink but from women too. They are only allowed to eat and drink each day after night-fall. Charity is of two kinds—Zakaat and Sadka, and there are rules

according to which alms have to be given. As for Haj or pilgrimage to Mecca, Mahammad might have had two ideas in his mind. One is that he did not think it wise to disturb the belief of the Arabs who, irrespective of being polytheistic or theistic, held the Kabah in singular veneration and the other is the consideration of his own faith, associating him and his life's activities with Mecca. Polygamy is permissible, but no Muslim can marry more than four wives at a time. Besides, when a woman is divorced, she cannot remarry before at least a period of three months elapses from the date of the divorce. The period is called Iddat and is probably provided for the detection of whether or not the woman is big with a child. If pregnant, she must be delivered of the child, before she gets remarried.

The Quran is both a religious script and a social-cum-moral code for the Muslims to follow. Of late, the Islam as a faith has passed through a great deal of reorientation at the hands of the progressive thinkers, particularly of the Suffists who have, from the devotional and emotional point of view, brought it nearer to the mystic and, to a great extent, to the Hindu way of thought. One of them, Jallaluddin Rumi, has gone so far as to reject the theory of Resurrection in favour of reincarnation. He writes:

"I died from the mineral and became the plant,
I died from the plant and reappeared in an animal
I died from the animal and became a man,
Wherefrom then should I fear?
When did I grow less by dying?
Next I shall die from the man,
That I may grow the wings of the Angels,
From the Angels too must I seek an advance" etc.

A few of the mystic thinkers entertain the belief that Mahammad is one of the incarnations of God, of whom Krisna is another. In the words of Prof. S. Radhakrishnan, "the semitic tendencies (in the Islamic religion) have yielded to the mystic ones." The intellectuals have now begun to think that "the dry bones of a religion are nothing, the spirit that quickens the bones is all." And in spirit as well as "in substance all religions are one and the same." (S. Radhakrishnan: *The Heart of Hindusthan*, P. 62.) If all leaders of religions begin to think like this, the world shall be a place for gods to live in.

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BY THE SAME AUTHOR

A STUDY OF ALEXANDER'S SPACE, TIME AND DEITY

One of the foremost exponents of Modern Realism and perhaps the only Neo-realistic philosopher to build up a comprehensive system, Samuel Alexander occupies a unique position in the history of modern philosophy.

In the study of Alexander's Magnum opus "Space, Time and Deity", Dr. Dasgupta attempts a critical estimate of all the basic concepts of Alexander's Philosophy with occasional references to similar thoughts in the West as well as in the East, for effective criticism always means proper exposition and evaluation alike. In analysing the notions of Space-Time, Section & Perspective, Categories & Empirical qualities, Mind, Values, etc., Dr. Dasgupta arrives at the Truth that transcends the Space-Time matrix of Alexander and that Dr. Dasgupta finally identifies with something like a Spiritual Principle analogous to the Absolute of the monists or God of the theists. In the preparation of the book, that was originally a thesis submitted at the University of Dacca, for the degree of the Doctor of Philosophy, Dr. Dasgupta has used, as far as practicable, conversational style so as to make it an enjoyable study for those of us who are not much acquainted with the technicalities of the philosophical literature. This book, we hope, will also remove a long felt want of the students of philosophy in general who have little time to read through the stupendous volumes of Alexander's Philosophy and to go deep into the subtleties and complexities of his thoughts.



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